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Fundamental Dimensions of Law
and Legal Education:
Perspectives on Curriculum
Reform, Mercer Law School's
Woodruff Curriculum, and...
"Perspectives"
by Mark L. Jones*
The curriculum decisions law schools argue about are more important
than we are willing to admit. They are about the meaning of our life's
work through our responsibility for the work and lives of our students.
They are about how our story will be told, in other words, when it is
told truthfully. So, I suggest in conclusion something you probably do
not want to hear-I do not want to hear it either-and that is that we
are not only entitled to get upset about curriculum matters, we are also
obligated to do so. In thirteenth century France, the battle for control
of the curriculum of the University of Paris was understood to be a
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I am deeply indebted to my colleagues Dick Creswell and Jack Sammons for their very
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review process that led to its focus on "perspectives," and for teaching me so much about
legal education over the years. I am also deeply indebted to my colleague Dean Gary
Simson for conceiving this curriculum symposium project and for being such a
conscientious, patient, and thorough editor. Even though none of them will agree with
everything I say, this Article would be much poorer without their vital contributions to its
development.
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struggle for the souls of students. Perhaps they perceived its importance correctly.'
This Article is the third in a series of articles that are intended to
address in depth my central concerns about the law school curriculum
and associated professionalism issues.2 This larger project, which I have
entitled "Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education,"' seeks
to make the case for the liberalization of U.S. legal education,' although
perhaps the term reliberalization would be more accurate given the
emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers during the first phase in
the history of U.S. legal education.' Whereas the two prior articles are
essentially descriptive-the first being conceptual6 and the second
historical in nature7-the present article is essentially normative. Like
the first article, and unlike the second, it does not purport to be based
on extensive research of the relevant literature, but is rather an
extended essay on a curricular philosophy that has been maturing over
many years.

1. Jack L. Sammons, Traditionalists,Technicians, and Legal Education, 38 GONE. L.
REv. 237, 250 (2002-2003) (footnote omitted).
2. For the prior two articles, see Mark L. Jones, FundamentalDimensionsof Law and
Legal Education: A Theoretical Framework, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547 (2001)
[hereinafter Jones, Theoretical Framework];Mark L. Jones, FundamentalDimensions of
Law and Legal Education:An HistoricalFramework-A History of U.S. Legal Education
Phase I: From the Foundingof the Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041
(2006) [hereinafter Jones, HistoricalFrameworkPhase I].
3. The larger project also envisages one or two coursebooks.
4. The present Article, and indeed the entire project, is animated by the same spirit
that animated the pioneering work of a distinguished alumnus of Mercer Law School sixty
years ago. See Brainerd Currie, The Materialsof Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL EDUc. 331(1951);
8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955).
5. See generally Jones, HistoricalFramework Phase I, supra note 2.
6. Thus, within the framework of the overall project, the first article puts the
educational issues with which I am concerned into a broader theoretical perspective, and
lays the project's conceptual foundation, by developing a taxonomic schema for thinking
about law, lawyering, and legal education, and by developing an additional theoretical
framework for curricular evaluation and comparison that draws upon this schema. The
schema and its six sets of "fundamental dimensions of law," which I term the substantive,
structural, practical, social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law, are discussed
further infra Part IA. See generally Jones, Theoretical Framework, supra note 2.
7. The second article builds upon the conceptual foundation laid in the first article. It
is one of several envisaged articles that are intended to put the educational issues with
which I am concerned into a broader historical perspective, and to lay the project's
historical foundation, by tracing the historical development of U.S. legal education since
the founding of the Republic until the present day, and by considering how the six sets of
fundamental dimensions of law have in fact been treated in the curriculum of studies
during the several different phases in this historical development. See generally Jones,
HistoricalFramework Phase I, supra note 2.
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My original plan for this normative component of the project had been
to address subject matter and courses dealing with the cultural
dimensions of law (that is, the historical, jurisprudential, and comparative dimensions of law) and the transnational dimensions of law.
Although these have been my constant central concern in the project, I
decided to address subject matter and courses dealing with the social
dimensions of law as well.' Thus, I focus on subject matter and courses
that are commonly regarded as providing "perspectives" on law and
lawyering.'
This somewhat modified focus of the present Article has been
occasioned by the process of curricular review in which Mercer Law
School engaged for the past three years, culminating in the adoption by
the faculty of several reforms to Mercer's "Woodruff Curriculum" in the
spring of 2011. More specifically, it has been occasioned by my own
involvement in a spirited and passionate debate regarding a proposal to
eliminate the curricular requirement that students take at least one
perspectives course from a slate of such courses in a Perspectives Block.
As amended, the proposal resulted in replacing the requirement with a
"strong recommendation" that students take such a course.
This Article maintains that students should take at least one
perspectives course during their law school career. It is written with
passion and deep conviction by someone who has been teaching law for
over thirty years and whose passion and conviction about the importance
of "perspectives" has only grown stronger over the years, even in the face
of skepticism and opposition.10 The Article also puts into a broader
context not only the particular issue of "perspectives," but curriculum

8. The nature of the social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law is addressed
further infra Part IA.
9. More precisely, then, I focus on subject matter and courses that address the social
and cultural dimensions as well as some of the transnational dimensions. I will address
subject matter and courses dealing with all of the transnational dimensions collectively,
including those that are not commonly regarded as providing "perspectives" on law and
lawyering, in a future article. Courses currently in the Perspectives Block at Mercer
illustrate the type of subject matter addressed. They include: American Legal History;
Bioethics and the Law; Comparative Law; European Union Law; Fundamental Perspectives
on Law; Gender and the Law; International Law; Jurisprudence; Law and Economics; Law
and Religion; Law, Genetics, and Neuroscience; and Race, Racism, and American Law.
Course Descriptions:Perspective Courses, MERCER LAW, http://www2.law.mercer.edu/cour
ses/index.cfm?blockid=6 (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
10. My hope is that it will assist those in the legal academy who wish to defend an
existing perspectives course requirement in the face of a proposal to eliminate it or to
introduce such a requirement where none had existed before, or at least to support a
"strong recommendation" that students take such a course.
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issues and curriculum reform in general, and it explains how Mercer's
Woodruff Curriculum fits into this broader context.
As the epigraph suggests, curriculum issues are important. Struggles
over curriculum issues are struggles for the souls of our students. More
than that-in fact because of that-they are also struggles for the soul of
the legal profession and the society it serves. These related struggles are
part of the continuing conversation about what it means to live under
the Rule of Law and about how best to secure the values involved in so
living. That conversation is a dialogue involving all branches of the
profession, and the formative law school curriculum is at its foundation.
I am in complete agreement with the view that the primary mission
of a law school is to prepare students for legal practice, although I would
also recognize a secondary mission of preparing them for positions of
civic and political leadership. For far too long (ever since the "Langdelhan Revolution" that began in the 1870s), and despite its great strength
in developing the cognitive analytical skills of "thinking like a lawyer,"
American legal education has lagged behind professional education in
other fields, such as medicine, in its failure to place sufficient emphasis
upon the practical dimensions of the discipline. In this respect it has also
lagged behind legal education in other developed countries, such as
Britain and the countries on the European continent. That began to
change in the second part of the twentieth century, with the growth of
the clinical movement for example.n Significant additional impetus was
provided by the MacCrate Commission Report in 199212 and the ABA
Professionalism Committee Report in 1996.13 The adoption of the
Woodruff Curriculum in 1989 placed Mercer ahead of the curve, and
even in a position of national leadership, in this respect.' 4
The publication in 2007 of the Carnegie Report on Legal Education"
and the Study on Best Practices for Legal Education"' has intensified

11. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s 214-16, 240-41 (1983).
12. ROBERT MACCRATE EL AL., AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE
REPORT].
13. AM. BAR AsS'N, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, REPORT OF THE
PROFESSIONALISM COMMITPEE (1996) [hereinafter PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT].
14. The Woodruff Curriculum is discussed further infra Part II.
15. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS].
16. RoY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [hereinafter
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES].
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the momentum for greater attention to these practical dimensions in
legal education.
These developments are to be applauded." I hope it will be clear,
then, that in emphasizing the importance of perspectives courses I am
not speaking as some "ivory tower academic" who values learning for its
own sake. I believe strongly that ensuring that students receive a
serious and sustained perspectives exposure during their legal education
is of critical importance in preparing them for the practice of law. As I
will argue, such perspectives help develop substantive knowledge,
practical skills, and qualities of character needed by the good and
practically wise lawyer. They are also vital in preparing students for
positions of civic and political leadership. Due to the continuing powerful
influence on students and faculty of what I call "the neo-Langdellian
prejudice" regarding what is of central importance and what is not,"
the only way to ensure that students receive a serious and sustained
perspectives exposure is to require that they take a course specifically
dedicated to that purpose.
Part I provides context for the discussion of curriculum issues and
curriculum reform that follows. Part II addresses the Woodruff
Curriculum that Mercer Law School adopted in 1989 as a comprehensive
and holistic reform of the existing curriculum. The Woodruff Curriculum
contained a requirement that all students take at least one course from
a slate of courses in a Perspectives Block. Part III evaluates this
requirement and perspectives courses generally. It ultimately suggests
that the only way to ensure that students receive a serious and
sustained perspectives exposure is through the imposition of a perspectives course requirement and the incorporation of perspectives material
into other courses.

17. Given my own particular holistic philosophy of legal education, which emphasizes
preparing the "complete lawyer" for practice through the optimal balance in exposure to,
and experience with, all the relevant dimensions of law and lawyering, I am especially
gratified that many law schools are now placing a greater emphasis on the development
of lawyering skills, professionalism, experiential learning, and public service.
18. The original "Langdellian prejudice" de-emphasized courses related to the practical
dimensions of law and lawyering as well as courses related to the social, cultural, and
trananational dimensions of law (and thus perspectives courses). What I call the "neoLangdellian prejudice" now accords increasing value to the former but retains its
Langdellian prejudice against the latter.
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PUTTING CURRICULUM REFORM IN CONTEXT

The jurisprudential, historical, and practical perspectives in Part I
provide broader context for the discussion of the Woodruff Curriculum
in Part II and the discussion of perspectives courses in Part III, as well
as for the consideration of curriculum issues and curriculum reform in
general.
A. Theoretical Framework-FundamentalDimensions of Law and
Lawyering
I have found it helpful in my scholarly activities and in my teaching
to think in terms of a taxonomic schema that identifies six sets (and
various subsets) of "fundamental dimensions of law"-the substantive
dimensions of law, the structural dimensions of law, the practical
dimensions of law, the social dimensions of law, the cultural dimensions
of law, and the transnational dimensions of law." Because these are
the fundamental dimensions of a modern legal system and represent
different types of "sources of law," they are also the fundamental
dimensions of lawyering in a modern legal system.20 Moreover, because
these fundamental dimensions are addressed in the various courses in

19. For an expanded account of this theoretical framework, see Jones, Theoretical
Framework, supra note 2, at 562-94. For a more condensed account, see Jones, Historical
Framework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1164-70. Use of the term "dimensions" of law is
intended to evoke a broad concept of law that includes much more than "substantive law"
and to express the notion that all these "dimensions" are appropriately conceived as aspects
or parts of law itself rather than-for example, in the case of the social or cultural
dimensions-as something "external" to law. For further discussion, see Jones, Theoretical
Framework, supranote 2, at 564-65. Use of the term "fundamental" connotes the idea that
at least some dimensions within each set (and indeed within each subset) of dimensions,
and various aspects of those dimensions, are fundamental for law and legal education. It
also connotes the idea that the boundaries separating the sets and subsets can serve as the
basis for a classificatory system of law and legal education. For further discussion, see id.
at 563-64.
20. By "sources of law," what is meant, primarily, is that they represent different kinds
of human influences that operate as causal factors in producing legal outcomes. The good
lawyer must be able to identify, process, and frequently manipulate the multiplicity of
causal factors related to various fundamental dimensions of law that have an actual or
potential, direct or indirect role in shaping the decisions leading to those outcomes. For
further discussion, see Jones, Theoretical Framework,supra note 2, at 594-601, and infra
Part III.A.
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the law school curriculum, they are fundamental dimensions of legal
education as well.2 '
I recognize that the articulation of such a taxonomic schema is an
exercise in analytical jurisprudence that may not be to everyone's
taste. However, I have found the schema to be a powerful tool that
can be put to many different uses." Such intellectual constructs as the
taxonomic schema should have their place in our thinking, but like

21. Courses in the law school curriculum can be grouped and organized into six similar
categories (and subcategories) that concern the six sets (and subsets) of fundamental
dimensions of law and lawyering. For an account of an additional theoretical framework
for evaluating how the fundamental dimensions are treated within the law school
curriculum, as measured by the degree to which the curriculum emphasizes the six sets
(and various subsets) of fundamental dimensions, and the degree to which students are
exposed to those dimensions during their law school education, see Jones, Theoretical
Framework, supra note 2, at 608-29. For a more condensed account, see Jones, Historical
Framework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1170-74. For an application of this framework in
evaluating various types of law studies curricula during the first phase in the history of
U.S. legal education (from the founding of the Republic until the 1860s), see id. at 1174-94.
22. Although the schema appears to fragment law and lawyering in a highly artificial
and reductionist manner, I am using it, paradoxically, as part of a strategy to combat the
reductionist fragmentation of law and lawyering that led to a devaluing of perspectives
subject matter in the law school curriculum, and to help restore a properly integrative and
holistic understanding of law and lawyering, by using the same kinds of tools that led to
a fragmented and reductionist understanding in the first place.
23. Elsewhere, I have identified three main ways in which the fundamental dimensions
schema could be used to examine a particular legal system in any or all of its dimensions.
Thus, it can be used: (1) To undertake an "objective" and "neutral" examination of a legal
system from an external point of view; (2) To undertake a hermeneutical exploration of the
"subjective" internal point of view of those who inhabit a legal system, but again from an
external point of view; and (3) By those who share the internal point of view as they
undertake law-related activities within their own legal system. For further discussion, see
Jones, Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 566-68 (also warning against the risk of
possible distortion due to the influence of one's own particular "perspective" and
"subjectivity"). I have used the schema in my teaching to demonstrate the importance of
understanding the whole context, and to facilitate efforts at "cultural immersion," when
making comparisons among the legal experiences of different peoples across time and
across space. In this regard, compare Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:A DynamicApproach
to Comparative Law (pts. I & II), 39 AM J. COMP. L. 1, 343 (1991) (identifying several
different kinds of "legal formants" of legal rules and legal outcomes that bear some
resemblance to various types of fundamental dimensions of law in my own fundamental
dimensions taxonomy). As discussed supra note 21, in an earlier article I used the schema
to illuminate various types of law studies curricula during the first phase in the history of
U.S. legal education. Here, I use the schema to illuminate the contemporary law school
curriculum. More specifically, I use it to illuminate curriculum issues in general, to analyze
and evaluate Mercer Law School's Woodruff Curriculum, and to highlight the importance
of "perspectives" subject matter to a proper understanding of law and lawyering and hence
the need to ensure that law students receive a serious and sustained exposure to such
subject matter during their legal education.
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everything else, they should, of course, be kept in their place.' The
taxonomic schema is intended to capture the complex "multicontextual"
or "multidimensional" reality of law and of lawyering in a modern legal
system by conveying a sense of the total context, and reality, of a
modern legal system as a functioning whole.25 Although analytically

24. For a somewhat playful attempt to do this by articulating a possible seventh set of
fundamental dimensions of law-the postmodern dimensions of law-see Jones, Theoretical
Framework, supranote 2, at 601-08. The attempt is playful, at least in part, because even
the most ardent and radical postmodernist cannot avoid intellectual constructs (whatever
the particular socially constructed origin of such constructs might be), as indeed is
evidenced by postmodernists' very use of language to make their arguments and even to
engage in the activity of textual deconstruction. That is simply the game modern humans
play, especially modem "homo academicus." For the origin of the phrase "homo
academicus" (for which, regrettably, it seems I can claim no credit), see PIERRE BOURDIEU,
HoMo ACADEMICUS (Peter Collier trans., 1984).
The alternatives to using such intellectual constructs are a return to the assumed chaos
of the primordial human mind or a mystical descent into the darkness and silence of the
Godhead beyond all sense impressions, thoughts, and conceptualizations. But then, the
latter is a different type of game altogether, although not one without a certain appeal.
Drawing upon the tradition of the Via Negativa in Western Christian mysticism and the
tradition of Zen Buddhism in Eastern mysticism, Matthew Fox describes this latter
alternative in the following terms:
The Enlightenment-the en-light-en-ment-has rendered all of us who live in
Western civilization citizens of the light. And of lights. Questers after leftbrain-which is light-oriented-satisfaction ....
How does one learn to recover the darkness and to befriend it again? And how
does a people learn this?.. .

In addition to meditating on our very real relationship to darkness and to its
ever-present companion, mystery, we also need to let go of all meditations, all
images, all likenesses, all projections, all naming, all contact with isness. The need
for silence that Zen speaks of, that wisdom literature celebrates, that Eckhart
praises, and that Merton calls for is not just about oral silence. Silence means the
letting go of all images-whether oral ones or auditory ones or visual ones or inner
ones or cognitive ones or imaginative ones. Whether of time or of space, of inner
or of outer. It is a radical letting go of language. A letting language go. A
concentration on what is non-language, non-music, non-self, non-God. It is being.
A being still.. .. In this sinking into silence and non-imaging we do not have to
be afraid, for God is "superessential darkness," and to make contact with the
darkness is to make contact with the deepest side of the Godhead....
And there can be no symbols or images that are allowed to hang around-not
even our names and symbols for God can go unchecked.
MArHEW FOX, ORIGINAL BLESSING: A PRIMER IN CREATION SPIRITUALITY PRESENTED IN
FouR PATHS, TWENTY-SIx THEMEs, AND Two QUESTIONS 134-37 (1983).

25. We might usefully refer to this as "the layered contextual complexity of law and
lawyering." This phrase is adapted from UGO A. MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER'S
COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 262 (7th ed. 2009) (noting the "layered
complexity" of legal systems, in which the different layers may have a different relationship
to various foreign legal systems, and attributing the term "layered complexity" to Adam
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distinct from every other set, each set of fundamental dimensions is part
of an overall context and reality supplied by all of them together, and
every legal situation confronting the lawyer occurs within this overall
context and reality.
In the same way that different types of tissues, organs, fluids,
structures, and functionalities are parts of the organic living system
known as a human being, the different types of fundamental dimensions
of law are parts of the living social system known as the legal system."
They are the diverse threads in the "seamless web" of the law." And
just as the practice and teaching of holistic medicine identifies and
appropriately addresses all the interdependent dimensions of the human
being relevant for a properly integrative response to the whole person-physical, mental, emotional, social, and spiritual-so too the practice
and teaching of holistic lawyering must identify and properly address all
the interdependent dimensions of the legal system relevant for a
properly integrative response to the legal situation."

Czarnota & Martin Krygier, Revolutions and the Continuity of European Law, in
REVOLUTIONS IN LAW AND LEGAL THOUGHT 90 (Zenon Bankowski ed., 1991)).
26. For a good account comparing the mechanistic and reductionist CartesianNewtonian worldview with an ecological and holistic worldview involving a systems
approach to the understanding of living biological and social systems, see Fritjof Capra,
Turning Point: A Science of Living Systems, http://www.sfsu.edu/-holistictactivism/a_sci
ence.of_1iving.systems.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
27. See Jones,Theoretical Framework,supranote 2, at 597 nn.74, 75 (elaborating upon
the image of the "seamless web" and discussing its possible origins). The six sets of
fundamental dimensions are systemically pervasive (so that the fundamental dimensions
are dimensions of each other), and mutually interactive (so that changes in one or more
dimensions can frequently produce changes in other dimensions). For further discussion,
see id. at 571-73 (explicating the "multidimensional" or "multicontextual" reality of law and
lawyering in a modem legal system, including these two features, in six analytical steps).
28. For a discussion of holistic medicine, see Holistic Medicine, THE FREE DICTIONARY,
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Holistic+Medicine (last visited Feb. 28,
2012); What isHolisticMedicine?, HousTIC MED., http://www.holisticmed.com/whatis.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012). As indicated in the text, I am using the term "holistic
lawyering" in the sense of lawyering that understands the legal situation in all its
complexity and multidimensionality. In addition, the term "holistic lawyer" can also be
used to convey something similar to the actual practice of holistic medicine, that is, a
lawyer who seeks to serve the client as a whole person and thus "uses a multi-disciplinary
approach for her clients' immediate needs, by examining the spiritual, mental, and
emotional conditions that caused their legal challenges or dilemmas to arise." Reva Brown,
Why Go to a Holistic Lawyer, INTUIT, http://business.intuit.com/directory/article-why-go-toa-holistic-lawyer (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). I am certainly not opposed to such an
approach. However, even under a more conventional approach that does not seek to
respond to the client as a whole person but just to the client's more narrowly understood
"legal situation," it is necessary to practice an expansive and integrative form of lawyering
to serve just the client's "legal" needs.
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With these preliminary considerations out of the way, we can now set
about constructing the taxonomic schema as it applies to a modern legal
system." The discussion of each set of fundamental dimensions will
include a few illustrative courses whose primary emphasis is upon
dimensions within that particular set.o
The substantive dimensions of law concern in particular the legal
norms governing the relationship of individuals (and associations of
individuals) with each other and with the state itself." Illustrative
courses include Contracts, Torts, Property Law, Criminal Law, and
various courses in the area of administrative law.
The structural dimensions of law concern in particular those legal
norms governing legal institutions, legal actors, and legal processes,
which together make up the "law machine."3 2 Illustrative courses
include Constitutional Law, Legislative Process, Civil Procedure,
Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Legal Professions (structure and roles
aspect).

29. Clearly, construction of the schema builds upon the work of several other scholars
who have analyzed the structure of legal education or the nature of a legal system. See
Jones, Historical Framework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1169 n.450 (identifying Alfred
Zantzinger Reed (structure of legal education) and Karl Llewellyn, H.L.A. Hart, and John
Henry Merryman (nature of a legal system)).
30. Use of the expression "primary emphasis" implies, of course, that a course may
incorporate some emphasis on other dimensions, either within that particular set of
fundamental dimensions or within another set of fundamental dimensions. See infra notes
49, 51, and Part U.B. The notes following the description of each set of fundamental
dimensions will also indicate possible subsets of that set.
31. Possible subsets of the substantive dimensions of law might be the following:
private law dimensions and public law dimensions. For further discussion, see Jones,
Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 574-76 (also discussing different types of legal
norms such as rules, principles, conceptions, and standards).
32. Possible subsets of the structural dimensions of law might be the following: the
legal institutions dimensions, the legal actors dimensions, and the legal processes
dimensions; or, alternatively, the legislative dimensions, the administrative dimensions,
the adjudicative dimensions, the legal profession dimensions, and the legal education
dimensions. For further discussion, see id. at 577-79 (also discussing the dimensions of
legal extension and legal penetration into the social fabric).
Although the substantive and structural dimensions together comprise the doctrinal (or
normative) dimensions of law, and represent "substantive law," it is important to separate
them analytically. For further discussion, see id. at 578 n.43. With respect to the
relationship between the doctrinal dimensions and the jurisprudential dimensions, and
specifically certain species ofjurisprudential thought within the categories of analytical and
normative jurisprudence that have focused on the doctrinal dimensions, see id. (identifring
Langdellian legal science, legal process jurisprudence, and Dworkin's individual rights
jurisprudence). See also Jones, HistoricalFramework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1105-21
(discussing natural law theory and early American legal science).
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The practicaldimensions of law concern in particular the substantive
knowledge, the practical skills, and the qualities of character and
professional values lawyers need when performing their various roles
and tasks within the legal system.' Illustrative courses include Legal
Analysis, Legal Writing, Legal Research, Counseling, Negotiations, Trial
Practice, Moot Court Competition, Legal Ethics, and Legal Professions
(values aspect).
The social dimensions of law concern in particular those other
disciplines such as political science and various other social sciences
(economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc.) through which the
"socio-legal world" and indeed the entire social order are intellectualized.' Illustrative courses include: Law and Politics, Law and Economics, Law and Society, Law and Anthropology, Law and Psychiatry/Psychology, Law and Literature, Law and Religion."
The cultural dimensions of law, which are the historical, jurisprudential, and comparative dimensions of law, concern in particular the roots
of law-related phenomena in the past, in profound speculation, and in
the legal experience of other peoples." Illustrative courses include

33. Possible subsets of the practical dimensions of law might be the following: the
substantive knowledge dimensions, the practical skills dimensions, and the professionalism
dimensions. The substantive knowledge dimensions concern theoretical knowledge about
all six sets of fundamental dimensions of law. For further discussion, see Jones, Theoretical
Framework, supra note 2, at 580-81 (also discussing the important category of"nonofficial"
legal actors).
34. Exploration of the social dimensions of law is concerned with examining the actual
decisions and actions of official and nonofficial legal actors from the perspective of: the
behavioral or social factors influencing those decisions and actions; the product of those
decisions and actions themselves; and the behavioral or social effects of those decisions and
actions. Possible subsets of the social dimensions of law might be the following: the political
dimensions, the economic dimensions, various other social science dimensions, the literary
dimensions, and the religious dimensions.
35. Regarding the relationship between the social dimensions and such interdisciplinary courses (including the strength and even the very (re)recognition of the social
dimensions as such), on the one hand, and the jurisprudential dimensions of law,
specifically the category of "social jurisprudence," on the other, see Jones, Theoretical
Framework,supra note 2, at 583 n.48, 585 n.49, 586 n.54, 588 n.57 (identifying sociological
jurisprudence, American legal realism, the law and economics movement, the critical legal
studies movement, the feminist legal movement, the law and literature movement, and
various types of postmodern legal thought). See also infra note 36 and accompanying text
(identifying different categories of jurisprudence).
36. Possible subsets of the cultural dimensions of law might be the following: the
historical dimensions, the jurisprudential dimensions, and the comparative dimensions. For
further discussion, see Jones, Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 585-88 (also
distinguishing between the categories of analytical jurisprudence (primarily positivist,
descriptive, and focused on the conceptual), normative jurisprudence (primarily critical,
prescriptive, and focused on the moral), and social jurisprudence (descriptive and/or
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courses in the areas of Legal History, Jurisprudence, and Comparative
Law.
The transnationaldimensions of law, which are a different order of
dimensions from the preceding five sets, concern in particular a vast
body of ever-expanding transnational law as well as the processes of
"transnationalizing" the national economic, social, and legal environments." Illustrative courses include International Law, Human Rights
Law, International Conflict of Laws, International Business Transactions, Immigration Law, and European Union Law.
Each set of fundamental dimensions supplies a level of context, reality,
and meaning and enables the other dimensions and any legal situation
to be seen in a broader perspective. 5 However, it is those courses

prescriptive and focused on the social) and noting the manifestation of these three
jurisprudential perspectives in the context of theories of adjudication and legal reasoning).
My use of the term "cultural" to describe this set of fundamental dimensions is derived
from Brainerd Currie and is to be distinguished from cultural in the sense of social. See
Jones, HistoricalFramework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1168 n.448.
37. Possible subsets of the transnational dimensions of law might be the following:
transnational law dimensions and the transnationalization dimensions, the former
including public international law dimensions, private international law dimensions (in a
narrow sense, international conflict of laws; in a broader sense, international business
transactions), immigration law dimensions, regional integration dimensions, and foreign
law dimensions. For further discussion, see Jones, TheoreticalFramework, supra note 2,
at 589-94 (also explaining the distinction between the preceding five sets of fundamental
dimensions, concerned with phenomena occurring solely within a national context, and the
transnational dimensions, concerned with phenomena that cross national borders and with
external influences and linkages, as well as the distinction and relationship between the
transnational dimensions and the comparative dimensions).
38. The same may be said regarding each subset of fundamental dimensions and indeed
regarding each individual dimension. In addition to the images of a living organic system
and a "seamless web," see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, the images of
concentric circles or of nested Chinese boxes or Russian dolls may help further illuminate
this multicontextual or multidimensional reality. Thus, individuals (and associations of
individuals) are part of a larger organized communal reality, comprising the state and its
subjects, in which their conduct is subject to governmental control in the form of legal
norms laid down by the state. The substantive dimensions of law put the conduct of
individuals into the context of government by law. The law is part of a larger structural
reality, comprising a legal system within which law develops and within which it is applied
and enforced. The structuraldimensions of law put law into the broader context of a legal
system. The law and the legal system are part of a larger practical reality, comprising a
working legal system that is operated by official legal actors (legal practitioners, judges,
legislators, law professors, and so on) and that affects, and is used by, nonofficial legal
actors. The practicaldimensions of law put the law and the legal system into the broader
context of legal practice. The law, the legal system, and legal practice are part of a larger
social reality, comprising both a "socio-legal world" that animates the working legal system
as it "really" operates and indeed the entire social order in which the law, the legal system,
and legal practice are all interwoven with other social phenomena in a richly textured
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addressing subject matter related to the social and cultural dimensions
of law (as well as some of the transnational dimensions) that have been
regarded traditionally as "perspectives" courses." This restricted usage
of the term "perspectives" reflects a narrow view of law, a neo-Langdellian prejudice, in which courses addressing subject matter related to the
substantive, structural, and practical dimensions of law are "real law,"
and other courses, addressing the social and cultural dimensions (as well
as various of the transnational dimensions), are not "real law" but at
best provide perspective on "real law." In other words, they are easily
understood as being concerned with something external, outside "the
law."40 In fact, however, the perspective gained from attending to these
other dimensions of law is a broader internal perspective on a situation

social fabric. The social dimensions of law put the law, the legal system, and legal practice
into a broader social and intellectual context. The law, the legal system, legal practice, and
their social dimensions are part of a larger cultural reality, comprising the very roots or
foundations in which they are ultimately embedded. The cultural dimensions of law put
the law, the legal system, legal practice, and their social dimensions into an even broader
context that transcends the situatedness of our particular time, intellectual horizon, and
place. National legal systems (comprising the preceding five sets of fundamental
dimensions) are all part of a larger global or transnational reality, comprising the
worldwide economic, social, and legal environment in which goods, services, capital, people,
information, ideas, and various other phenomena, cross national borders, both within and
beyond different regions of the world, at an ever-increasing and accelerating rate. The
transnationaldimensions of law put national legal systems into their broader global
context.
39. As reflected supra note 36, given their concern with the very foundations or roots
of law, those courses addressing the cultural dimensions of law-courses such as Legal
History, Jurisprudence, and Comparative Law-can be regarded as courses concerned with
fundamental "perspectives."
40. Attitudes toward courses addressing subject matter related to the transnational
dimensions of law as a whole are perplexing. Many of these courses ought to be considered
"the real thing" too, particularly given the obvious direct impact of the areas of
transnational practice on life prospects (for example, immigration law) and/or bank
accounts (for example, international business transactions) and the origin of much
transnational law in familiar and now traditional formal sources of U.S. law, such as
statutes and administrative regulations. That such courses are still relatively marginalized
in the mainstream law school curriculum in the United States is the result not only of a
type of neo-Langdellian prejudice but of another type of prejudice too. But this is a topic
for another day and another article.
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arising within the legal system. 4 1 Understood in this sense, use of the
term "perspectives" to refer to such courses is perhaps less problematic.
B. HistoricalNarrative-Riseof the Langdellian Prejudiceand the
Loss of Perspective
The first phase in the history of U.S. legal education extends from the
founding of the Republic until the 1860s. During this time there were
three different settings in which lawyers might receive a formal legal
education, frequently following a period of other study at a college. Most
common was apprenticeship with a practicing lawyer. However, it was
also possible to receive institutionalized legal instruction in a college or
university law program or at an independent law school.4 1 Many of the
curricula in the apprenticeship and college or university law programs
settings displayed a striking breadth of coverage, and there was a
remarkable emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers in all

41. Because this perspective is achieved by the lawyer "looking around" at, or
responding to, the context of the situation, one could also think of the matter as gaining
a broader internal perspective from the vantage point of that situation within the legal
system. Returning to the earlier images of concentric circles, nested Chinese boxes, or
Russian dolls, see supra note 38, the legal situation can be pictured at the very center.
Moreover, because each set of fundamental dimensions represents a level of reality for the
legal situation, it is misleading to characterize the social and cultural dimensions as not
being "real law." Indeed, following Michael Polanyi, they can even be seen as higher levels
of reality in a hierarchy of such levels and thus as "more real" than the levels below them.
See Jack Sammons, Confronting the Three Apprenticeships,in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING: THE ROLE OF CHARACTER, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND PROFESSIONAL FORMATION (Mark
L. Jones et al. eds., forthcoming Jan. 2013) [hereinafter TOWARD HuMAN FLOURISHING]
(quoting MICHAEL POLANYI, KNOWING AND BEING: ESSAYS FOR MICHAEL POLANYI 155
(Maijorie Grene ed., 1969)) ("When reality is defined in these [multi-level] terms, so that
at the highest level of our knowledge reality offers an 'indefinite range of unexpected
manifestations,' the intangibles at the highest level-justice, beauty, morality, religion,
etc.-suddenly appear as more real than the tangible at the lowest and .... necessary to
understanding the tangible, necessary to considering it as real.").
42. Perhaps the most famous independent law school is the Litchfield Law School.
Sometimes such institutionalized legal instruction was combined with apprenticeship. For
a detailed discussion of all these settings and of the curricula of studies followed in them,
see Jones, HistoricalFramework PhaseI, supra note 2, at 1062-95. However, during the
latter part of the period many of those practicing law may have received no formal legal
education at all. See id. at 1059-61 (discussing the lowering of educational standards and
requirements for admission to the Bar that occurred during the second part of this period,
partly or even largely as a result of the atmosphere created by Jacksonian Democracy in
the 1830s and 40s, including a dramatic decline in the percentage of jurisdictions requiring
a period of apprenticeship training for admission as well as the prevalence of oral and
usually casual bar examinations).

20121

LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION

989

settings." By the time they completed their formal legal education,
students in all three settings were adequately exposed to all six sets of
fundamental dimensions of law through the strategy of a required
curriculum of studies. The remarkable emphasis upon a broad education
for lawyers likely reflected the prevailing professional ideal of the
lawyer-statesman and the political philosophy of civic republicanism
underpinning that ideal." It was widely understood that law students
should be prepared for both legal practice and political leadership by
helping them become liberally educated lawyer-statesmen, possessing
the character virtues of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness, who
would serve their clients and the Republic by doing their jobs in a broadminded way."
After this first phase in its history, U.S. legal education gradually
became centered in university law schools.46 Robert Stevens provides
the following succinct summary of the main stages in the process:
In the 1870s, legal education essentially meant a requirement for some
period of law study followed by a bar exam. The second stage of growth
had been recognition of law school as an alternative to apprenticeship.

43. This latter evaluation includes the independent law schools and takes into account
various factors in addition to the curricula in the law programs themselves, in particular
the exposure to certain subjects that students received during a prior college education (or
its equivalent). For a detailed curricular analysis and evaluation, see id. at 1176-89. For
the methodology used, see id. at 1170-76.
44. See id. at 1121-52 (examining the nature and general influence of the lawyerstatesman ideal, with its emphasis upon the twin character virtues of practical wisdom and
civic-mindedness, and the political philosophy of civic republicanism, and explaining that
the lawyer-statesman ideal served to inspire lawyers both as legal practitioners and as
political leaders of the Republic), 1152-64 (evaluating the influence of the lawyer-statesman
ideal upon legal education specifically), and 1189-94 (summarizing the influence on the
curriculum of the natural law and legal science elements in the prevailing jurisprudence
and of the professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman and the political philosophy of civic
republicanism underpinning that ideal).
45. See id. at 1152-64, 1192-94 (discussing the pedagogical goals of legal educators in
apprenticeship training, in college or university law programs, and at independent law
schools). The twin character virtues of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness are related
in that deliberating and acting in a particular way (with practical wisdom), procedurally,
produces a particular public good appropriate to the context, substantively, and the
disposition to deliberate and act in this way arises out of a civic-minded concern to achieve
that substantive good. For a sophisticated philosophical account of the ideal of the lawyerstatesman, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEAS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION (1993). See also Jones,HistoricalFrameworkPhaseI, supra note 2, at 1122-28
(discussing Kronman's account of the professional ideal of the lawyer statesman in the
nineteenth century).
46. For a good discussion of pertinent developments related to this process, see
generally STEVENS, supra note 11.
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The third stage was the requirement of law school without the alternative of office study, and the fourth was recognition solely of ABAapproved law schools coupled with the requirement of attendance at
college as well. The third and fourth stages in the movement had
begun in the 1930s and were to come to fruition in the postwar
years.47
Beginning in the 1870s with the reforms of the curriculum instituted
by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School," the
mainstream curriculum became both narrower and seriously disconnected from the needs of the legal profession. By the mid-1920s, the
mainstream law school curriculum had significantly reduced the
emphasis placed upon the practical dimensions of law. It also placed no
significant emphasis upon the social dimensions of law, no significant
emphasis upon the cultural dimensions of law, and no significant
emphasis upon the transnational dimensions of law.49 In short, there

47. Id. at 205. The American Bar Association (ABA) was established in 1878. Id. at 27,
92. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) was established in 1900. Id. at 96-97.
The establishment of these organizations was part of a more general attempt to raise the
standards of the profession following the decline in educational standards and requirements for admission to the Bar that had occurred during the second part of the first phase.
See supra text accompanying note 42. The process of tightening up state requirements for
admission to the bar was already well underway before 1890, and by the 1920s most states
required some specific period of formal training, either in a law office or at a law school,
as well as the successful completion of a written bar examination (although some states
granted the so-called "diploma privilege," whereby the bar examination was waived for the
graduates of certain law schools). See STEVENS, supranote 11, at 25-27, 33 n.44, 94-95, 9899, 174, 182 n.27.
48. For a discussion of Langdell's reforms at Harvard Law School and their influence
on other law schools, see, for example, ALFRED ZAN'TZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE
PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOuNT OF
CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 343-45, 354-68, 369-88, 391-94 (Arno Press 1976)
(1921); STEVENS, supra note 11, at 36-39, 61-64, 96 n.33.
49. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAw SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA 252-56 (Arno Press 1976) (1928) (discussing the subjects included in law

school curricula in 1925-1926). The statement in the text should perhaps be qualified with
respect to the cultural dimensions of law, insofar as the study of cases and other texts in
doctrinal courses does, at least incidentally, inevitably convey a sense of the historical
context and the jurisprudential paradigm within which the cases are decided. Similarly,
subjects taught by the case method not only impart knowledge of substantive law but also
develop the practical skill of legal reasoning and associated dispositions. These are
examples of how a student can receive some generalized exposure to a set of fundamental
dimensions of law (here, the cultural dimensions and the practical dimensions respectively)
when that exposure is incorporated into a course with a different primary emphasis
because it is inherent in the materials used for, or otherwise informs and is reflected in the
teaching of, the course. The development of the mainstream law school curriculum from
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was no significant emphasis upon the subject matter of perspectives
courses.so Despite some improvements in later years," the social,
cultural, and transnational dimensions of law, and thus perspectives
subject matter, continue to be relatively neglected and marginalized
within the curriculum. 2

the 1870s until the 1920s will be examined in greater depth in the next historical article
in my Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education series of articles, addressing
the second phase in the history of U.S. legal education (the phase of Langdellian legal
science).
50. This meant, of course, that members of the legal profession had to compensate for
these deficiencies in legal education through some combination of a broad pre-law
education, self-education, on-the-job training, and the articulation and maintenance of
professional standards by the organized bar. For the same reasons, the narrowing of legal
education did not necessarily entail an undermining of the lawyer-statesman ideal.
Moreover, to some extent, even a more narrowly focused legal education may have still
supported the ideal. For example, according to Anthony Kronman, the case method of
teaching-at least when done well-works to develop a student's practical wisdom (in
particular the core capacity of sympathetic detachment) and civic-mindedness, the twin
virtues of the lawyer-statesman. KRONMAN, supra note 45, at 109-21; see also id. at 154
("Whatever other ends it serves, the case method of law teaching also promotes the
character traits of prudence and public-spiritedness that the ideal of the lawyer-statesman
stressed, and long after the disappearance of the conditions that originally sustained it,
helps to keep that ideal alive in the habit-forming classroom experiences to which all
beginning lawyers are exposed."). Not everyone agrees with Kronman's claim, however,
that the lawyer-statesman ideal remained highly influential throughout most of the
twentieth century. For further discussion of this disagreement, see Jones, Historical
Framework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1139 n.361.
51. These improvements are due in particular to the development of elective courses
and the incorporation of perspectives subject matter into other courses. The development
of the elective curriculum after the first phase in the history of U.S. legal education-an
elective curriculum that became increasingly broader after the end of the second phase (see
supratext accompanying note 49)-and the remarkable proliferation of courses addressing
the social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law in recent years are documented
in a series of curriculum surveys and studies that have been conducted over the decades.
See further Jones, HistoricalFrameworkPhase I, supra note 2, at 1174 n.458, 1196 n.570
and accompanying text. The incorporation of "perspectives" subject matter into other
courses is an example of how a student can receive some specific exposure to a set of
fundamental dimensions of law when that exposure is incorporated into a course and/or
course materials with a different primary emphasis. The situation with respect to the
practical dimensions of law has also clearly improved during this period. The development
of the mainstream law school curriculum from the 1920s will be examined in greater depth
in one or more subsequent historical articles in my Fundamental Dimensions ofLaw series
of articles, addressing the third and fourth phases in the history of U.S. legal education
(that is, the legal realist phase, lasting from the 1920s until the 1960s, and the postrealist
and postmodernist phase, lasting from the 1960s until the present, respectively).
52. As will be explored further infra Part u.B, the availability of a wide range of
elective courses and the incorporation of perspectives subject matter into other courses
represent a partial and inadequate solution for redressing the dysfunctional curricular
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C. Professional Formation:Becoming a Good and PracticallyWise
Lawyer
It is just as imperative for legal educators today, as during the first

phase of legal education, to form liberally-educated lawyers, possessing
the character virtues of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness, who will
serve their clients and the Republic by doing their jobs in a broadminded way. I now inquire more closely into the nature of these virtues.
1. PracticalWisdom
Good lawyers are practically wise lawyers.ss Practical wisdom enables
imbalance created after Langdell and for reintegrating the social, cultural, and
transnational dimensions within the mainstream law school curriculum. Moreover, any
mitigation of the narrowing of the law school curriculum that may have resulted from
students receiving a broad general college education before coming to law school has
diminished significantly during the last few decades with a dramatic decline in the
percentage of law students possessing the once traditional background in the liberal arts.
See, e.g., DAviD L. KIRP, HUMAN RESOURCES, MANAGEMENT, AND PERSONNEL: SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE MARKETING OF HIGHER EDUCATION 5,53-54
(2003).

53. For a more detailed version of the schematic account given here, see Mark L. Jones,
PracticalWisdom, Vocation, and ProfessionalFormation:A SchematicAccount, in TOWARD
HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 41. Regarding the central role of practical wisdom in good
lawyering, see STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 67-69 (asserting that
"[i]n order to succeed as lawyers, students must acquire the habit of mind needed for
competent law practice, which in medical education is referred to as 'clinical judgment' and
by some legal scholars as 'practical judgment' or 'practical wisdom'"). For a good discussion
of the importance of good practical judgment in everyday lawyering activities, see Mark
Neal Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of Good Lawyering, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2002) [hereinafter Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox], quoted by
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 68-69:

Although skill in legal reasoning is not as closed a process of reasoning as
sometimes supposed, everyday lawyering activities are even less subject to
formally structured deliberation. The factual situations are almost always fraught
with complications, contingencies, and uncertainties. The areas of inquiry have no
pre-definable limits and include small and large matters. Whether gathering
information, communicating with others, planning courses of action, or contemplating client options, attorneys constantly make judgment calls. A lawyer's
reliance on judgment runs the gamut from how to order and frame questions when
interviewing or counseling clients, to what research leads to follow, to how to
decide major issues of legal strategy, to how to identify and seek to reconcile
conflicting moral obligations. What the client regards as the problem may or may
not be the problem. There may be a legal solution, but it is not clear that it would
be the best solution. In short, in the practice of law, how best to proceed and what
exactly to say and do are almost always problematic.
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the lawyer to do "the right thing in the right way at the right time."
More specifically, it enables the lawyer to engage, almost instinctively,
in good practical reasoning about ends as well as means and to translate
good judgment into action. The practically wise lawyer draws upon an
ensemble of deeply ingrained and seamlessly integrated professional
attributes-theoretical knowledge, practical skills, and qualities of
character"-in a manner that is appropriately responsive to context.55
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 68 (quoting Aaronson, Thinking Like
a Fox, supra, at 32). Stuckey and his co-authors consider that law schools should make it
a central goal to develop their students' capacity for practical wisdom:
Students arrive in law school with varying abilities to exercise judgment, but
they do not have the professional knowledge or experience to exercise practical,
judgment in legal settings. Law schools have a special obligation to help students
begin to develop practical judgment in legal settings, though the task neither
begins nor ends in law school. For law schools "[t]o make judgment a curricular
focus, rather than just an aside, requires coming to grips with not only what it
means to say someone has and uses good judgment, but also to what extent and
under what circumstances practical judgment is a skill and disposition that can
be learned."
Id. at 70 (quoting Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider:LearningAbout Practical
Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 247, 249 (1998) [hereinafter Aaronson,

PracticalJudgment]).
54. Just as the different types of fundamental dimensions of law are the diverse
threads in the "seamless web" of the law, see supra text accompanying note 27 and
accompanying text, so too the various types of theoretical knowledge, practical skills, and
qualities of character-the fundamental dimensions of the lawyer as it were-are the diverse
threads in the "seamless web" of the lawyer. Similarly, just as the six sets of fundamental
dimensions of law are systemically pervasive (so that the fundamental dimensions are
dimensions of each other), and mutually interactive (so that changes in one or more
dimensions can frequently produce changes in other dimensions) within the context the
lawyer confronts, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, so too the various types of
theoretical knowledge, practical skills, and qualities of character are systemically pervasive
and mutually interactive within the lawyer in a similar way. Cf STUCKEY ET AL., BEST
PRACTICES, see supra note 16, at 60 (emphasizing the holistic nature of lawyer competence
and stating that "[c]ompetence requires the integrative application ofknowledge, skills, and
values"). Moreover, this is necessarily how they develop in our students during their legal
education. See Sammons, supra note 41 (discussing the holistic nature of student learning
through the "case method" and observing that "[Tihis teaching ... is as much about
professional identity (including the virtue of seeing good arguments on both sides ... ) and
skills as it is about knowledge-more so in fact"). There may be a parallel with Polyani's
hierarchy of levels of reality here too, with values or qualities of character being the
highest and most fundamental, and hence "most real," level. See supra text accompanying
note 41.
55. In some situations, the practical reasoning involved when making a practically wise
judgment (and calling into play relevant attributes to do so) may appear "intuitive" and
instantaneous; in other situations, especially those that are complex and ambiguous, the
practical reasoning involved requires careful deliberation. Although study alone may be
sufficient for the acquisition of much requisite theoretical knowledge, habitual practice and
experience are necessary for the cultivation of requisite practical skills and qualities of
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It is the master virtue of practical wisdom that enables the lawyer to
call into play the relevant attributes from the ensemble of attributes and
to conduct the entire ensemble appropriately." When a situation
involves others, practical wisdom requires good ethical judgment as
well.57
To be practically wise, then, the lawyer must not only acquire the
theoretical knowledge and practical skills that comprise technical

character in the ensemble of attributes. Regarding the frequent complexity and ambiguity
in situations confronting the lawyer, see, for example, STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES,

supra note 16, at 68:
Practical judgment is "the key faculty needed when lawyers seek to identify,
assess, and propose concrete solutions in particular and often complex social
circumstances." In law practice it is the norm rather than the exception for
lawyers to encounter situations where it is not clear what outcomes would best
serve clients' interests and where lawyers must weigh multiple and complex
options to find the most appropriate means for achieving any outcome. Determining the best course of action in such situations requires the exercise of practical
judgment.
Id. (quoting Aaronson, PracticalJudgment, supra note 53, at 249) (footnotes omitted).
56. Cf STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 68-69 (quoting Aaronson,

Thinking Like a Fox, supranote 53, at 32) ("In such situations, it is the lawyer's capacity
for reflective, not determinant, judgment that is regularly tested. One's ability to identify
and apply the law is but one skill and one form of reasoning needed, and often enough not
the most important. The critical attribute is not the attorney's legal knowledge but his or
her ability to bring to bear, competently and sensibly, the appropriate breadth and depth
of knowledge, whether rooted in schooling or experience, that best addresses the particular
matter at-hand. The high development of this capacity for reflective judgment is what
accounts for good practical judgment in lawyering. It is a process of deliberation that
involves the contextual synthesizing and prioritizing of a range of factors, including facts,
feelings, values, and general and expert knowledge, all at once. It is what is needed
intellectually to reach a cohesive and balanced conclusion when there is no straightforward
method for resolving competing concerns.").
57. For further exploration of the procedural elements comprising the master virtue of
practical wisdom, see David T. Ritchie, Being PragmaticAbout Practical Wisdom, in
TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 41 (describing five "distinct steps" of "inquiry"

in the pragmatic reasoning characteristic of the competent practitioner who makes
practical and wise decisions). For further exploration of the substantive elements involved,
see Jack Sammons, Guidelinesfor Observing PracticalWisdom at Work, in TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING, supra note 41 (describing five "central components" of practically wise
deliberation). See Barry Schwartz & Kenneth Sharpe, The War on Wisdom and How to
FightIt, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 41 (describing six "moral abilities"

of the practically wise person); see also Darcia Narvaez, Neurobiology and Virtue
Cultivation, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supranote 41; Thomas Lickona, Developing
the Ethical Thinker andResponsible Moral Agent, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra

note 41 (describing various elements of "moral expertise"); Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox,
supra note 53, at 34-37, as discussed in STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16,

at 69 (describing "six key characteristics and dynamics regarding the nature of practical
judgment" generally and in lawyering specifically).
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expertise but must acquire certain qualities of character and become a
certain type of person.5 ' Among the qualities at the heart of the good
lawyer's professional character are possessingpractical wisdom, valuing
practical wisdom as central to the moral ideal of professionalism, and a
sense of calling to become a lawyer with practical wisdom. In this way,
becoming a practically wise lawyer is also at the heart of the good
lawyer's sense of identity and purpose.
Of course, the above account is a schematic account providing a
skeletal structure to which substance must be added: What sorts of ends
can be "the right thing" to aim at? What sorts of means can be "the right
means"? What ensemble of attributes does the good lawyer need-what
theoretical knowledge, what practical skills, what qualities of character?
Where does the virtue of civic-mindedness fit into the overall analysis,
if it does? And most crucially for our present inquiry, how does a serious
and sustained perspectives exposure help a student discover the answers
to these questions and instantiate those answers?"
2. ProfessionalAttributes of the PracticallyWise Lawyer
The identification and analysis of specific professional attributes of the
good and practically wise lawyer helps demonstrate why a serious and
sustained perspectives exposure is critical for the development of these
attributes. I turn now to the primary such professional attributes."

58. Technical expertise is often thought of in terms of competence. However, there is
no distinction between competence and character if competence itself is understood as
requiring qualities of character and the exercise of practical wisdom. See Ritchie, supra
note 57 ("IP]ractical wisdom [is] not .. . some difficult-to-attain ideal but. .. the mark of
experts operating competently within their professional domains."). For a good discussion
of how to move students towards practical wisdom through a "pedagogy of engagement,"
see Daisy Hurst Floyd, Pedagogy andPurpose: Teachingfor PracticalWisdom, 63 MERCER
L. REV. 943 (2012) (identifying a framework comprising four elements: identity, community,
responsibility, and a body of knowledge).
59. We are not without guidance on these matters. For a survey of various statements
of professional attributes, see STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 50-55

(describing various statements of "desirable outcomes" of legal education, that is, "the core
general characteristics and abilities that we might want new lawyers to possess").
Interestingly, and tellingly, two of these statements (by Lasso and Mudd) explicitly, and
several others implicitly, include "perspective" as a desirable outcome. Id.
60. In addition to various accounts of the nature of practical wisdom (see the references
given supra note 57; see also supra text accompanying note 56 (Aaronson quote)), I rely
upon the 1992 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, and the 1996 PROFESSIONALISM

COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, that between them identify and analyze many of the
practical skills and qualities of character the practically wise lawyer needs in the ensemble
of professional attributes. Although the analytical approach in the various accounts of
practical wisdom and in these two ABA Reports may appear to fragment the professional
attributes of the good lawyer in a highly artificial and reductionist manner, my intent in
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a. Qualities of Character,Lawyer Professionalism,and Sense of
Calling
To begin with qualities of character" before considering practical
skills and substantive knowledge,62 I first consider certain general
qualities of character that have been identified as central in various
accounts of practical wisdom. I then examine qualities identified in two
ABA reports.
i. General Qualities of Character. A critical quality identified in
the various accounts of the nature of practical wisdom is the ability
simultaneously to empathize and to retain a sufficient degree of
detachment to ensure the independence that is also necessary for wise
judgment. For example, Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe state that
"a wise person can take the perspective of another to see the situation
as she does, to understand how she feels."63 In addition, however, "a
wise person knows .

...

how to find the mean ....

between empathy

and detachment, or between fairness, treating all students alike, and

invoking them is once again, paradoxically, precisely the opposite. It is part of the overall
strategy to combat the reductionist fragmentation of law and lawyering that led to the
devaluing of perspectives subject matter in the law school curriculum and to help restore
a properly holistic and integrative understanding of law and lawyering by using the same
kinds of analytical tools that led to a fragmented and reductionist understanding in the
first place. See supra text accompanying note 22.
61. For a discussion of the nature of qualities of character, or "character traits," see
KRONMAN, supra note 45, at 74-76. Kronman explains that although some character traits
may have an intellectual dimension, a character trait is essentially an "affective habit" or
"a feeling one experiences, without deliberate effort, in recurrent situations of some kind."
Id. at 75. Such character traits determine a person's "core identity." Id. at 76. However, not
all affective habits qualify as character traits:
If a disposition is too trivial, or widely shared, it is unlikely to be viewed as a
constituent of personal identity and classified as a trait of character. Thus we
regard courage, for example, as a trait of character because the possession or lack
of it so deeply shapes our perception of who a person is, but we do not normally
consider his love of brandy (a trivial habit) or fear of death (a universal one)
similarly revealing.
Id.
62. This is consistent with the suggestion, articulated by my colleague Jack Sammons,
that "a school should start thinking about its curriculum by seeking faculty agreement on
what kind of lawyers it wants its students to be. I do not mean what they, the students,
should be able to do, although that is part of it, but what they should be." Sammons, supra
note 1, at 245.
63. Schwartz & Sharpe, supra note 57 (identifying six "moral abilities possessed by a
wise person or a mensch," that is, the ability to attend to the particular circumstances, to
find the mean, to improvise, to empathize, to aim at the right things, and to draw on
experience, take initiative, and learn from mistakes).
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giving this unique individual what she deserves."
Sharpe explain:

As Schwartz and

To be empathetic is to be able to feel what the other person is feeling.
But empathy is more than just a feeling. In order to be able to feel
what another person is feeling, you need to be able to see the world as
that other person sees it. This ability to take the perspective of another
demands perception and imagination. Empathy thus reflects the
integration of thinking and feeling....
Development of genuine empathetic understanding is not automatic.
It depends on experience. But we seem to be predisposed to profit from
the experience if we have it....
There is, as yet, no final and complete story about how empathy
develops in children. But what is known about the importance of the
right kind of experience in nurturing empathy in children provides
important lessons if we are interested in nurturing empathy in adults.
Adults, too, need the right kind of experience, and disciplined rulefollowing doesn't provide it."
It seems that, in addition to personal experience of one's own, the
necessary experiences for the development of practical wisdom also "can
be derived from the experience of others, fictional or historical, if the
experience is adequately internalized."' In his insightful enumeration

64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY To DO
THE RIGHT THING 71-72 (2010). For further discussion, see id. at 69-80 (also discussing the
concept of emotional intelligence). See also Sammons, supra note 57. In his analysis of the
second of five components of practically wise deliberation (the deliberation involves means
and ends, is driven by the actual particularities of context, relies heavily upon internalized
past experiences, is sufficiently aware of itself to consider and correct for its limitations,
and considers the character and not just the consequences of the action to be taken),
Sammons explains that:
"Deliberation driven by the actualparticularitiesof a particular context" requires
strong abilities of perception, good listening, empathy with others (for the
purposes of understanding) combined with the detachment honesty requires, moral
and factual imagination, determinations of relevance, and determinations of
importance including an insistence upon the relevance and importance of the
emotions to deliberation, and so forth.
Id.

66. Id. Sammons explains further that:
"Deliberation that relies heavily upon internalizedpast experiences" requires, in
part, having intuitions that can be applied to the task at hand and, in other part,

an acquired practical knowledge about humanity, e.g., how people are likely to
react to various events tempered with an acute awareness of the human potential

for unpredictability. Internalized experiences are often personal ones, but they can
be derived from the experience of others, fictional or historical, if the experience
is adequately internalized. So, for example, there is practical wisdom in the

998

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

of the general qualities of professional character needed by the
practically wise lawyer, Jack Sammons specifies various qualities
encompassed by the general quality of empathy combined with
detachment, as well as several that fall outside it:
[The ability to recognize what is shared in competing positions; an
attentiveness to detail, especially linguistic detail; an attentiveness as
well to the ambiguities of language; a use of these ambiguities both for
structuring the conversation and analyzing the issue; a focus on text
and a markedly different sense of its restraint; a rhetorical awareness
of the reactions of potential audiences to each competing position and
even to each argument; an imaginative anticipation of future disputes;
a realistic assessment of the situation even as a partisan in it; a
recognition of the persuasive elements of all positions, especially those
in opposition to the lawyer's own; a very particular form of honesty; an
insistence on practicality combined with an acceptance of complexity;
a shying away from broad principles and "proud words"; a concern with
the procedures by which decisions are to be made; an equal concern
with the quality of the roundtable conversation itself including a
concern that all voices round the table be well heard and considered;
an evaluation of positions in terms of an objective hypothetical
authoritative decision-maker who serves as stand-in for social
judgment, and, thus, a consideration of each proposed course of action
from a particular social perspective.67

common law which can become personal for those who relive the experience of
common law through the narrative it provides. There is practical wisdom in
history for those for whom the same is true. In fact, the way in which one
internalizes the experiences of others is primarily through experiencing them as
narratives.
Id. (footnote omitted).
67. See Sammons, supra note 1, at 246 n.28 (quoting Jack L. Sammons, The Georgia
Crawl, 53 MERCER L. REV. 985, 985-86 (2002)). Sammons further notes that '[these] are
observable characteristics of the person-of what he or she has become-rather than of
performances of particular tasks-of what he or she can do."Id. In specifying these qualities
Sammons is addressing "those virtues carried by the practice by which we identify good
lawyering when we see it." Id. He hypothesizes a community group (comprising a priest,
an accountant, a business executive, a psychologist, an engineer, a philosopher, a physician,
a city planner, an architect, and a lawyer) dealing with a difficult and complex problem
facing the community, and considers that another lawyer could readily identify the lawyer
in the group "even if the conversation had not afforded the lawyer the opportunity to
display his or her knowledge of legal matters." Id. (quoting Jack L. Sammons, The Georgia
Crawl, 53 MERCER L. REv. 985, 985 (2002)). While conceding that "many other practices
may shape its practitioners toward many of these same habits of thought, and surely this
is all a matter of degree," Sammons maintains that "these habits of thought, these virtues
of the practice of law, if you will, considered collectively can be seen as defining a unique
character for lawyers as an ideal." Id. (quoting Jack L. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, 53
MERCER L. REV. 985, 986 (2002)).
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In his most recent work, Sammons seems to be suggesting that the
most fundamentally necessary qualities of character-those upon which
all others depend for optimal efficacy (and upon which preservation of
the law itself depends)-include faith in the "mystery" of the law or the
legal situation, which means faith in the mystery of our own being in the
way of the law, and a certain humility before this mystery that will
allow us to listen for what the law or the legal situation is saying.
ii. Lawyer Professionalism and Sense of Calling. As a character
ideal,69 lawyer professionalism surely includes the general qualities of
character discussed above. However, it includes more, and that
additional meaning is my focus now."o
In its 1996 Report, the ABA Professionalism Committee notes a
perceived decline in lawyer professionalism since the 1980s. 7 1 Building
upon Roscoe Pound's understanding of the essence of a profession as
"pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service," the Committee defines a professional lawyer as "an expert in
law pursuing a learned art in service to clients and in the spirit of public
service and engaging in these pursuits as part of a common calling to
promote justice and public good."72 Elaborating upon this definition, the

68. See Jack. L. Sammons, Listeningto Law (manuscript for presentation at Pepperdine
Law School in Feb. 2012) (on file with author).
69. Professionalism in any profession is a moral or ethical ideal that is related to the
moral formation and character development of the professional practitioner. See generally
TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 41.
70. Here the discussion reflects the distinctive vocabulary developed by the language
of lawyer professionalism.
71. PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 2-3. The Committee
identifies six prevalent themes articulated in the relevant literature relating to this
perceived decline in lawyer professionalism: (1) concerns about lawyer competence and
lawyer ethics; (2) various negative consequences resulting from the growing commercialization of law practice (such as reduction of time available for public service activities and
growing dissatisfaction regarding incompatibility with personal values and goals); (3)
perceived excesses of the adversarial system, including loss of civility; (4) an undermining
of the lawyer's role as independent counselor; (5) the loss of a sense of the ultimate purpose
of lawyers as related to serving the public good by mediating between conflicting interests
in society; and (6) the loss of a sense of law practice as a "calling." See id. at 3-4
(identifying these themes in a different order from the order presented here).
72.

Id. at 5-6 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN

TIMES 5 (1953)) (emphasis omitted). Interestingly and tellingly, the Committee appears to
endorse the professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman, with its related twin character
virtues of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness; see id. at 5-9 & n.21, 31; see also supra
text accompanying notes 44-45, 50 and infra notes 134, 264 and accompanying text
(discussing the lawyer-statesman ideal, including Anthony Kronman's specific account of
that ideal, which the Committee also appears to endorse).

1000

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Committee identifies six "essential characteristics" of the professional
lawyer and twelve "supportive elements."" The six "essential characteristics" are: (1) Learned knowledge; (2) Skill in applying the applicable
law to the factual context; (3) Thoroughness of preparation; (4) Practical
and prudential wisdom; (5) Ethical conduct and integrity; and (6)
Dedication to justice and the public good.74 The twelve "supportive
elements" are: (1) Formal training and licensing; (2) Maintenance of
competence; (3) Zealous and diligent representation of clients' interests
within the bounds of law; (4) Appropriate deportment and civility; (5)
Economic temperance; (6) Subordination of personal interests and
viewpoints to the interests of clients and the public good; (7) Autonomy;
(8) Self-regulation; (9) Membership in one or more professional
organizations; (10) Cost-effective legal services; (11) Capacity for selfscrutiny and for moral dialogue with clients and other individuals
involved in the justice system; and (12) A client-centered approach to the
lawyer-client relationship which stresses trust, compassion, respect, and
empowerment of the client.7 ' The Committee explains the link between
these essential characteristics and supportive elements and the concept
of professionalism as follows: "[Pirofessional lawyers practice professionalism, by which we mean they embrace the characteristics or traits of
the professional lawyer as we have defined that concept." 76
In identifying these various qualities of character, the Professionalism
Committee built upon the 1992 MacCrate Commission Report. 7 The
MacCrate Report identifies four "Fundamental Values of the Profession"
to which the lawyer should be committed: (1) Provision of competent
representation; (2) Striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality; (3)
Striving to improve the profession; and (4) Professional self-development."

73. See PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6-7.
74. Id. (citing MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 140-41,207-21 (punctuation added
and quotation marks omitted for readability)).
75. Id. at 7 (citing MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 140-41, 207-21 (punctuation
added and quotation marks omitted for readability)).
76. Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, in the Committee's view the ideal it articulates in
its definition of lawyer professionalism is relevant for all lawyers, regardless of their
practice setting. Id. at 6 n.21.
77.

MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12.

78. Id. at 140-41 (format adapted and quotation marks omitted for readibility). The
MacCrate Report analyzes each of these four Values, breaking it down into its constituent
elements. Id. at 207-21. The Professionalism Committee considers that its six essential
characteristics and twelve supportive elements are also incorporated in the MacCrate
Report's formulation of these four fundamental values. See PROFESsIONALISM COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 13, at 7 n.23.
Although the text focuses on two ABA generated reports, there are of course other
illuminating and instructive accounts of needed values or qualities of character that
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PracticalSkills
The MacCrate Report is also helpful in identifying many of the
practical skills that are part of the ensemble of attributes needed by the
practically wise lawyer. It specifies ten "Fundamental Lawyering Skills":
(1) Problem solving; (2) Legal analysis and reasoning; (3) Legal research;
(4) Factual investigation; (5) Communication; (6) Counseling; (7)
Negotiation; (8) Skills necessary for litigation and alternative dispute
procedures; (9) Administrative skills necessary for the organization and
management of legal work; and (10) Skills involved in recognizing and
resolving ethical dilemmas."
b.

partially overlap and partially complement those in these two ABA reports. See, e.g.,
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 79-91 (discussing various accounts, and
emphasizing and explicating five professional values in particular: a commitment to justice;
respect for the rule of law; honor, integrity, fair play, truthfulness, and candor; sensitivity
and effectiveness with diverse clients and colleagues (implicating the skill of cross-cultural
competence); and nurturing quality of life). My colleague Pat Longan has developed an
analytical framework centered on five values of professionalism, which he uses to help
structure his required first year Legal Profession course-competence, fidelity to the client,
public service, fidelity to the law and the legal system, and civility. He also considers that
practical wisdom is needed in drawing upon these values in particular circumstances.
Clearly, the specific qualities of character identified by the Professionalism Committee
Report and the MacCrate Report, as well as those in other accounts, could also be grouped
and organized in terms of this framework. For further discussion of this pioneering and
ABA award-winning course, see infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
79. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 138-40 (format adapted and quotation marks
omitted for readibility). As in the case of the four fundamental values, the Report analyzes
each of these lawyering skills, breaking it down into its constituent elements. Id. at 141207. The MacCrate Report does not intend its identification and elaboration of skills and
values to be regarded as exhaustive. See id. at 132 (drawing a distinction between the
skills and values, identified in the Report, that are necessary for "ensuring practice at a
minimum level of competency" and the development of other skills and values that may be
necessary for excellence). On the other hand, the Committee does not consider that all
lawyers need to be familiar with all the skills and values it identifies. Id. at 125 (discussing
the situation of lawyers who work as part of a team, and new members of the profession
working under the supervision of a more experienced attorney).
We noted above other illuminating and instructive accounts of needed values or qualities
of character that partially overlap and partially complement those in the Professionalism
Committee Report and the MacCrate Report. See supra text accompanying note 78.
Similarly, there are other illuminating and instructive accounts of needed skills that
partially overlap and partially complement the account of skills in the MacCrate Report.
See, e.g., STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 65-73, 77-79 (discussing selfreflection and lifelong learning skills, as well as various intellectual and analytical skills,
and also presenting various listings of "professional skills").
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c. Substantive Knowledge
The MacCrate Report explicitly recognized the importance of
substantive knowledge as a necessary complement to the skills and
values it treats as fundamental. The Report made no attempt, however,
to prescribe "what aspects of substantive law should be included in a
course of preparation for all new members of the profession" because, in
its drafters' view, such a project is "sufficiently distinct from an analysis
of skills and values" that they "should not attempt to address both."o
The Report therefore was silent on the importance of including
perspectives subject matter in the curriculum."
II.

MERCER LAW SCHOOL'S WOODRUFF CURRICULUM

Something like the above vision of the practically wise lawyer has
animated Mercer Law School's Woodruff Curriculum ever since its
adoption in 1989. At its inception the Woodruff Curriculum was
ahead of its time in anticipating much that is included in the MacCrate
Report' and the Professionalism Committee Report of the 1990s" and

80. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 125. The Report also recognizes the
relationships and interdependence among the different skills and among the different
values as well as between the skills and values. See id. at 136-37. This recognition,
together with the Report's recognition of the importance of substantive knowledge as a
necessary complement to the skills and values, gestures towards the holistic nature of legal
practice. See supra notes 54-56, 60 and accompanying text.
81. As we will see infra notes 236, 244 the Professionalism Committee was not silent
on this matter.
82. This does not mean, of course, that each member of the faculty who voted to adopt
the various curricular reforms included in the proposal made by the Woodruff Committee
(often as significantly amended), or even each member of the Woodruff Committee itself,
would necessarily subscribe to the above account and its invocation of the MacCrate Report
and the Professionalism Committee Report without qualification. To have such an
expectation, particularly for members of a law school faculty, would be unrealistic, if not
utopian. For the views of one member of the Woodruff Committee, for example, see
Sammons, supra note 1, at 243-44, 247 (expressing various types of reservations with
regard to the MacCrate Report).
83. See, e.g., Richard W. Creswell, Mercer University: "Narrowingthe Gap in the Law
School Curriculum,"26 GA. STATE B.J. 165 (1990). The author, who was a member of the
Woodruff Committee, observes with respect to the MacCrate Report that "the Mercer
faculty dealt with many of the same issues outlined for attention by the ABA Task Force"
and describes "several features of Mercer's new curriculum that respond directly to the
concerns prompting the creation of the ABA Task Force." Id.
84. The MacCrate Report acknowledged and analyzed the dramatic increase in the
number of law school courses and programs providing skills and values instruction that
had occurred since World War II; however, it also identified several remaining deficiencies
in this respect. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6, 236-59. In light of these
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even the Carnegie Report on Legal Education and the Study on Best
Practices for Legal Education, both published in 2007.' Furthermore,
in the years since its adoption, the Woodruff Curriculum has evolved in
a number of ways that evidence an intent on the part of the Mercer Law
faculty to bring the curriculum more closely into line with various
recommendations made in the later reports." This can be seen most
clearly, perhaps, in the evolution of the professionalism component of the
curriculum.
A. ProfessionalFormation:Becoming A Good and PracticallyWise
Lawyer
After its adoption in 1989, the Woodruff Curriculum was rightly
regarded as a highly innovative and path-breaking approach to legal
education." In an article published in 1992, Lewis Solomon singled out

deficiencies, the Report made twenty-five specific recommendations aimed at enhancing
skills and values instruction in law school curricula and otherwise enhancing professional
development during the law school years. See id. at 259-60, 330-34. However, the Report
envisaged that law schools needed flexibility in determining how best to do so in light of
their particular situation. Id. at 259-60.
Similarly, the Professionalism Committee Report acknowledged the existing efforts of law
schools in the area of legal ethics and professionalism instruction, but also noted the
remaining deficiencies in this respect. See PROFESSIONALISM COMMITrEE REPORT, supra

note 13, at 13-16, 39-59 app. B. And once again, the Report included a set of recommendations for enhancing law school legal ethics and professionalism training. See id. at 16-25.
Once again, too, the Report recognized the need for law schools to retain flexibility in
determining how best to do so in light of their particular situation. Id at 16.
Both the MacCrate Report and the Professionalism Committee Report considered that
law schools and the practicing bar share responsibility for ensuring the proper professional
development of members of the legal profession, which they discharge in the manner
appropriate to their particular missions during an educational continuum that begins
before law school, includes the years at law school, and extends throughout a lawyer's
career; and both Reports, therefore, also included recommendations for the periods before
and after law school. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-8, 328-30, 334-37;
PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 2, 11-13, 25-34.
85.

SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 15; STUCKEY ET AL., BEST

PRACTICES, supra note 16. While using somewhat different terminologies, both works
essentially call for the balanced integration in the law school curriculum of substantive
knowledge, practical skills, and qualities of character and both emphasize the importance
of developing the capacity of students to exercise good professional practical judgment.
86. Of course, there is also much in these sources, especially the two most recent ones
in 2007, that it would behoove Mercer, like other law schools, to consider in an ongoing
evaluation of its curriculum.
87. See Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools: A
CriticalAssessment, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1992) (examining several different types of
curricular reforms adopted by various "pioneering" law schools during the previous five
years).
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Mercer as one of two notable examples of law schools that had recently
implemented "holistic curricular reforms designed to promote the
competency of their graduates." 8 Solomon explained that the faculties
of both law schools "took an overall look at their programs and sought
to integrate skills, theory and professional responsibility into a
traditional doctrinal base" and discussed how both schools "provide more
diversity in their teaching methods and skills as well as more structure,
thereby overcoming the typical lack of progression in course offerings."9

0
The Woodruff Curriculum is discussed in detail in Solomon's article"
as well as in articles by Dick Creswell and Jack Sammons, two members
9
of the Committee that drafted the original Woodruff proposal. ' The
discussion in this section will draw on the analyses in those articles.

1. Basic Approach in Designing the Woodruff Curriculum
Jack Sammons describes the basic point of departure in designing the
Woodruff Curriculum: "[A] school should start thinking about its
curriculum by seeking faculty agreement on what kind of lawyers it
wants its students to be. I do not mean what they, the students, should
be able to do, although that is part of it, but what they should be."92 In
Sammons's terminology, this vision of our graduates and of the ultimate
goal of a legal education is a "traditionalist" vision:
Traditionalists assume that thinking like a lawyer is the central
constitutive component of the practice. It is central in the same way
that practical wisdom is central to all Aristotelian virtues because the
ideas are the same. Thinking like a lawyer, as the practical wisdom of
our practice-although traditionalists have seldom expressed it this
way-is both the practice's primary internal good and its primary
product. It is not a skill and it cannot be well learned by teaching its
parts, nor can it be well measured by its products. It is much more a
matter of what a good student of the law will become in the process of
study than of what that student can do at the end. It requires nothing
less than a transformation of the person, an acquisition of a manner,
bearing, and style of thought for life.93

88. Id. at 1. Solomon identifies the University of Montana School of Law as the other
example. Id.
89. Id. at 27.
90. See id. at 27-30.
91. Creswell, supra note 83; Sammons, supra note 1.
92. Sammons, supra note 1, at 245; see also supra text accompanying note 62.
93. Sammons, supra note 1, at 238 (footnote omitted). Here Sammons is describing
traditionalist assumptions regarding "the central constitutive component of the
practice. . . ." Id. For Sammons's discussion of the traditionalist assumptions regarding
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This contrasts with another possible vision of our graduates and of the
ultimate goal of a legal education, which Sammons would describe as a
"technician" vision:
For technicians, however, the central constitutive component of the
practice of law is the acquisition and proficient utilization of certain
techniques in the performance of identifiable lawyering tasks. Practice
can be learned by teaching its parts and it can be measured by its
products. Learning the practice of law for technicians is more a matter
of what the good student can do at the end of law study than of what
he or she will become in the process."
Sammons considers that both approaches encounter various problems
in their pure form in contemporary circumstances. 5 He concedes that
"neither of the dominant schools of thought can provide a unified
conception of the practice and of learning that is adequate for making
sense of curricula decisions or teaching strategies."' In his view, the
solution is to "fuse these competing schools of thought into a single and
satisfying conception that does not unduly offend either school of
thought,"' and this, according to Sammons, is precisely what Mercer

"legal pedagogy, and the legal apprentice's relationship to the practice," see id. at 237-39.
94. Id. at 239 (footnote omitted). Here Sammons is describing technician assumptions
regarding "the central constitutive component of the practice . . . ." Id. at 239.

For

Sammons's discussion of technician assumptions regarding "legal pedagogy, and the legal
apprentice's relationship to the practice," see id. at 237-40.
95. For discussion of these problems, see id. at 242-43. Sammons summarizes the
problems as follows:
The traditionalists' problems are created by their reliance upon a central virtue
that has become too abstracted from the practice. Traditionalist assumptions offer
an Aristotelian way of determining what good lawyering could be, but these
assumptions provide no coherent methodology for either confirming or producing
it. The problems with technician assumptions are exactly the opposite. Their
assumptions offer a methodology for confirming and producing good lawyering, but
no way for determining what good lawyering might be. Obviously these problems
are very closely related. In the simplest terms, we could say that one school knows
where it is going and why, but not how to get there, while the other knows how
to get there, but not where it is going or why.
Id. This failure is at the heart of Sammons's critique of the MacCrate Report, supra note
12. See Sammons, supra note 1, at 243-44 (critiquing the MacCrate Report as offering a
technician-oriented, externally-derived "re-creation of the practice" rather than a
description of good practice internally derived from the moral authority of the practice
itself).
96. Id. at 245.
97. Id.
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sought to do in designing the Woodruff Curriculum." Thus, the Mercer
faculty started with a traditionalist vision of the virtues of the "good
lawyer" and combined that vision with the technicians' methodology.9
More specifically, we began by agreeing on the goal of preparing our
students "for the general practice of law."' As Sammons explains, "it
is only in preparation for the general practice of law that students can
begin acquiring the unique set of virtues that distinguishes the law as
a profession."' 0' We then worked backwards from this traditionalist
goal of "[what we] wanted [our] students to be and to be able to do in
their final semester" in order to "design a structured progression" toward
this end using technicians' means. ' This was not an overly programmatic and intensely analytical process requiring us to "catalogue the
type of thinking requisite to thinking like a lawyer-the knowledge,
skills, and the attitudes-and assign these to courses." 0 s Instead, "[we
sought] a structure in which a general progression toward the craft of
the general practitioner could happen for all students."'o
The expression "general practice of law" in the above formulation of
the ultimate goal could lead one to conclude that such a goal becomes
increasingly irrelevant the more that legal practice becomes increasingly
specialized. If the expression is understood, however, as referring to the
knowledge, skills, and qualities of character required for "the practice of
law in general"-those attributes that are required, then, to be a good
lawyer whatever one's area of practice might turn out to be' 0 -such a
conclusion would not be warranted. And the Woodruff Curriculum has
always rested as much, if indeed not more, on this latter understanding
as it has on the former.106

98. See id. at 245-48 (describing how a law school might go about doing the hard work
of bringing about the necessary "conversion to technical-traditionalists, or traditionaltechnicians, who are willing to examine the virtues of the traditionalists' good lawyer
together with the technicians' methodology" when designing a curriculum and concluding
that "[wihat I have been describing is the process Mercer Law School went through in
designing its Woodruff Curriculum").
99. Id. at 245.
100. Id.
101. Id. For Sammons's own account of what those virtues might be, see supra note 67
and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 246-47.
103. Id. at 247.
104. Id.
105. Something, moreover, that often may change over the course of a career.
106. Thus, from the beginning, the goal has been articulated in more generic terms. See
Creswell, supra note 83, at 165-66 (explaining that the faculty's "primary goal was a
curriculum that progressed logically towards the practice of law," and that "[slince the
logical progression was towards practice, that meant that there should be a logical
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2. Distinctive Featuresof the Woodruff Curriculum
The distinctiveness and novelty of the Woodruff Curriculum lay in the
inclusion of certain innovative courses as well as in the logical progression in the students'learning experience as they proceeded through their
three years at Mercer. Although I will not examine the original Woodruff
0
it is useful to review several distinctive
Curriculum in detail here,o'
features that the Woodruff Committee and the faculty considered
essential in order to prepare our students adequately for the practice of
law. 08 To ensure that all of our students would receive the benefit of
these essential distinctive features, and thus become the distinctive
Mercer lawyers we envisioned, we required them to take relevant
courses.109
First, we placed a special emphasis upon the extensive development
of a variety of lawyering skills. Second, we placed particular emphasis
upon the skill of legal writing. Third, we created and required a novel
first year course devoted to developing skills of statutory interpretation
and analysis. Fourth, we chose to make extensive use of simulations

progression in the knowledge, skill, and attitudinal learning that preparation for practice
required"); see also id. at 165 ("[I]t is safe to observe that Mercer has taken steps to ensure
that its future graduates will be better prepared to undertake the diverse responsibilities
of modern law practice than at any other time in the Law School's 117-year history.").
107. For a detailed description of the content of the Woodruff Curriculum, see id. at
166-68; Solomon, supra note 87, at 28-30.
108. These distinctive features reflect seven goals or aspirations the faculty adopted
to guide the Woodruff Committee throughout the curriculum review process:
[Al concentration on the skills of case analysis, through common-law vehicles,
during a significant part of the first year, semesterization of first-year courses to
yield benefits in the form of additional offerings, including seminars; after the
preliminary grounding in case analysis, a progression of skills and content
embracing essential features of the American legal system, such as the study of
basic techniques (e.g., statutory interpretation) and institutions (e.g., administrative agencies); faculty supervised writing experiences in each year of law study;
practical skills courses, including but not limited to, the replacement of courses
lost through the closing of the clinic; a more thorough introduction to the concepts
and practices of legal professionalism; and a required exposure to one or more
courses that would place the American legal system in perspective.
Solomon, supra note 87, at 28 n.127 (citing REPORT OF THE WOODRUFF CURRICULUM
COMMIrEE TO THE FACULTY OF MERCER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 2 (1989).
109. The extensive requirements necessary to ensure that all students received the
benefit of these essential distinctive features did not preclude a significant degree of
freedom of choice over the course of the entire three years. See Creswell, supra note 83, at
167 ("Required courses decrease, and electives increase, as the student moves through the
middle three semesters" and "(tiwo-thirds of the courses taken in the middle semesters ...
are electives.").
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instead of live-client clinics in order to ensure that all students, not just
a relatively select few, received the desired skills training.
Fifth, we designed the curriculum to ensure a structured progression
in skills training throughout the three years. This involved a "horizontal" progression for three particular skills. The first year would begin
with a one-week introductory course in legal analysis and synthesis, the
second year with one in counseling, and the third with one in dispute
resolution. The curriculum for the rest of the year would include a
"pervasive" emphasis on the skill featured in the introductory course.
There was also a "vertical" progression throughout the three years.
Training in a particular skill would build on the foundation provided by
earlier training in that skill or other skills. We also required students to
take an Advanced Skills course during their sixth and final semester,110 commonly taught by experienced practitioners.
Sixth, to promote the development of lawyer professionalism values
and a sense of calling, we required a sixth semester Perspectives on
Lawyering course team-taught by full time faculty and experienced
practitioners, and we enhanced the opportunities for close facultystudent interaction by reducing significantly the size of the student
body."1 ' Seventh, by several means, including requiring that students
take an Advanced Skills course and the Perspectives on Lawyering
course in the sixth semester, we made a conscious effort to provide a
"bridge to practice" in that semester.112

110. Creswell explains this feature as follows: "The Advanced Skills courses provide
advanced training in particular lawyering tasks already familiar to students (such as
Negotiation, Pretrial Practice, or Advanced Litigation Drafting), or apply general lawyering
skills to a particular lawyering context (such as Advising Small Business, Tax Research,
or Advanced Criminal Trial Techniques)." Id. at 166. It should perhaps be noted that the
original plan was to recruit full-time faculty to teach the Advanced Skills courses as part
of an effort to have the curriculum help shape the faculty into a faculty better suited for
it.

111. This reduction in class size, in turn, was made possible by a substantial gift by
George W. Woodruff. See Solomon, supra note 87, at 27 n.124 (discussing the gift), 28
(discussing the reduction in class size and resulting benefits).
112. The extensive use of experienced practitioners as adjunct faculty to teach many
of the Advanced Skills courses and the involvement of experienced practitioners in the
Perspectives on Lawyering course reinforced the "bridge to practice" character of the sixth
semester. Another distinctive feature of the sixth semester was a seminar requirement that
was intended to provide a kind of "capstone" writing requirement as well as a final
opportunity for rigorous academic reflection. It should be noted that, as originally
conceived, the "bridge to practice" in the sixth semester comprised the final ten weeks after
the February Bar exam. Following the abolition in 1996 of the option to take the Bar exam
in February and the resulting curricular adjustments, the entire sixth semester could be
conceived as a "bridge to practice."
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Eighth, we designed the curriculum to provide a structured progression not only in the development of lawyering skills but also in the
mastery of substantive subject matter."13 Ninth, we included three
"Block requirements" to ensure that all our students would receive an
education in three types of subject matter we considered essential for
legal practice. Thus we required them to take at least three courses from
a General Practice Block; at least one course from an Administrative
Block; and at least one course from a Perspectives Block made up of
courses that "afford students the opportunity to place lawyering and our
legal system in their broader contexts to deepen understanding and
better enable Mercer graduates to be constructive participants in the
continuing evolution of our profession and our legal system."" 4
3. Evolution of the Woodruff CurriculumPriorto the 2011 Reforms
Between 1989, when they first adopted the Woodruff Curriculum, and
2011, when they made the most significant revisions to date of that
curriculum, the faculty made several noteworthy revisions. First, we
relaxed some of the rigidity in the curricular requirements and in the
structured progression of substantive subject matter and skills in order
to increase student choice. This included eliminating the General Block
requirement in 1999 out of a recognition that fewer students were going
on to a career in general practice."11
Second, responding to a growing national perception of a decline in
lawyer professionalism and increasing reports of lawyers' dissatisfaction
with the practice of law,"6 from 2004 we have required all first-year

113. For a sophisticated discussion of the many types of progressions in the Woodruff
Curriculum, see Sammons, supra note 1, at 248-49 (identifying progressions in lawyering
functions, the materials of law study, lawyering tasks, substantive areas, the systems
studied, cross-cutting skills and good judgment, cross-cutting themes, and faculty relations
with students).
114. Creswell, supra note 83, at 167.
115. We also eliminated the requirement that students take the course in Basic Income
Tax, and we "loosened up" the structured progressions-for example, by permitting students
to satisfy the seminar requirement in the fifth semester, not only in the sixth, and by
permitting students in the sixth semester to take fourth semester courses with the relevant
faculty member's agreement (necessitated by the need to meet a separate early grading
deadline for third year students driven by the timing of graduation). The 2011 curriculum
reforms have relaxed remaining rigidities in the curricular requirements and structured
progressions even further.
116. See PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 2-5 (discussing
relevant themes and perspectives); see also supra text accompanying note 71 (discussing
six prevalent themes the Committee identified in the relevant literature). For additional
discussion of many of these themes, including an entire chapter devoted to the issue of
lawyer dissatisfaction, and references to relevant literature, see CARL HORN III,
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students to take a highly innovative Legal Profession course."' The
course, which has evolved over the years, continues to be taught by its
creator Pat Longan with some involvement by other full-time faculty and
experienced practitioners and judges."' This ABA-award winning
coursen' seeks to provide students with a firm foundation in the
meaning of professionalism 20 and an appreciation of how a commitment to the values of professionalism can provide a sense of calling and
purpose and the core of a professional identity. It also tries to give
students a realistic understanding of the challenges they will face in
living up to these values in practice.' 2' The first-year Legal Profession

LAWYERLIFE: FINDING A LIFE AND A HIGHER CALLING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 1-74 (2003).

117. In order to accommodate this new course in the first year curriculum, the course
in Statutory Law and Analysis was moved into the third semester (that course was also
reduced from three hours to one hour and then back up to two hours).
118. For a description of this course in 2009, see Patrick E. Longan, Teaching
Professionalism,60 MERCER L. REV. 659 (2009). For a shorter description of the course in
its current form after significant restructuring, see Patrick Longan & Timothy Floyd,
Mercer Law School's Focus on Professionalism, 2 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS-STUDENT
EDITION, no. 1, Jan. 31, 2011, at 12 (also describing the Law School's Public Interest
Practicum Program).
119. For his work on the course, Pat Longan received the 2005 National Award for
Innovation and Excellence in Teaching Professionalism from the ABA Standing Committee
on Professionalism, the National Conference of Chief Justices, and the Burge Endowment
for Legal Ethics. Longan, supra note 118, at 659 footer note.
120. The course uses a framework for thinking about professionalism that identifies
five central values: competence, fidelity to the client, public service, fidelity to the law and
the legal system, and civility. As discussed above, supra text accompanying note 78, the
specific qualities of character identified by the Professionalism Committee Report and the
MacCrate Report, as well as those in various other accounts, could also be grouped and
organized in terms of this five values framework.
121. Longan and Floyd describe the three central goals of the course as follows:
The required first-year Legal Profession course has three goals. The first is to
instruct students on what professionalism means for lawyers and why it matters
whether or not lawyers fulfill these expectations. Students learn about how these
values are challenged in practice so that they can develop sensitivity to
professionalism issues.
A second goal is for students to begin to form a professional identity and a
commitment to living up to the values of the profession. Part of this process is for
the students to learn how important it is for clients, the system of justice, and for
the public generally that lawyers live up to these virtues. Another part is for the
students to begin to understand that much of their own happiness as lawyers will
be tied to their adherence to the values of professionalism.
The third goal is to develop skills that will help students take appropriate action
when confronted with conflicting values. Students hone their skills of reflection,
self-awareness, reasoning and judgment so that they can better respond to
conditions of inherent conflict and uncertainty.
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course replaces the third-year Perspectives on Lawyering course.122 By
getting students to think about professionalism issues in their first year,
the course provides important grounding and context for the students'
courses throughout their three years," including for the Public
Interest Practicum Program introduced in 2006.24 Thus it facilitates
yet another logical progression in the curriculum.

B. Evaluation of the Woodruff Curriculum
There is considerable correspondence between the goals of the
Woodruff Curriculum and the good and practically wise lawyer described
in Part I.C. The Woodruff Curriculum has deliberately sought to develop
the various professional attributes of the good and practically wise
lawyer-the general qualities of character" and the specific characteristics of lawyer professionalism and sense of professional calling,"' the
necessary lawyering skills,127 and the necessary theoretical or substan-

Longan & Floyd, supra note 118, at 12. As the authors observe, at Mercer "[wle have
explicitly placed character development and the formation of professional identity at the
core of our curriculum." Id.
122. Like the Perspectives on Lawyering course it replaced, it serves as the main
complement to the traditional Law ofLawyering course focused on the rules of professional
responsibility.
123. The exploration of professionalism issues in other courses contributes to the goal
of teaching legal ethics and professionalism by the pervasive method as advocated by the
ABA Professionalism Committee. See PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
13, at 18-23 (explaining that "[tihe goal of a successful pervasive method need not be that
ethical and professionalism issues be covered in every law school course" but that "every
law student is exposed to ethical and professionalism issues in a systematic fashion during
each year of the J.D. program," and making several suggestions for teaching legal ethics
and professionalism by the pervasive method).
124. For a description of the Public Interest Practicum program, see Longan & Floyd,
supra note 118, at 13-14.
125. Supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. Thus, Jack Sammons offers his
depiction of those qualities, supra note 67 and accompanying text, as a vision of "the make
up of the good lawyer" that can "inform our teaching and curricula design" in general.
Sammons, supra note 1, at 246 n.28. And he suggests specifically that this is the
"traditionalist" vision that informed the design of, and to a considerable extent has been
achieved by, the Woodruff Curriculum in particular. Id. at 248 ("What I have been
describing is the process Mercer Law School went through in designing its Woodruff
Curriculum.").
126. Supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. This is especially apparent in the Legal
Profession course. Even before this course was created, the ABA recognized Mercer's
commitment to developing its students' professionalism by awarding the Woodruff
Curriculum the E. Smythe Gambrell Professionalism Award in 1996.
127. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. This is especially apparent in the skills
training contemplated by the Woodruff Curriculum. With regard to the special emphasis
on legal writing, Mercer has been ranked either first or second in the U.S. News & World
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tive knowledge.12 As will be shown in Part III, the Woodruff Curriculum's Perspectives Block requirement has made a unique and important
contribution in helping to develop these attributes.
Turning to the six sets of fundamental dimensions of law described in
Part L.A and the historical development of the mainstream law school
curriculum discussed in Part I.B, the Woodruff Curriculum's attention
to the substantive dimensions of law has much in common with the
mainstream law school curriculum.129 However, it has placed a greater
emphasis than the mainstream curriculum upon the following- the
structural dimensions of law (by requiring all students to take Statutory
Law and Analysis and at least one course from the Administrative
Block);"0 the practical dimensions of law (by requiring all students to
take. several lawyering skills courses and the course in Legal Profession);' and the social or cultural or transnational dimensions of law
(by requiring that all students take at least one course from the
Perspectives Block).'a
Perhaps the Woodruff Curriculum erred in not requiring a serious and
sustained exposure to the social and the cultural and the transnational
dimensions of law in specifically dedicated courses. In addition, it was
perhaps wrong not to require a sufficiently broad exposure within each
of these sets of fundamental dimensions in the courses that are
offered.'"3 Yet, these possible deficiencies notwithstanding, the
Woodruff Curriculum has represented a major improvement over the
mainstream law school curriculum. It has gone a long way towards

Report specialty ranking for Legal Writing since creation of that ranking in 2006. See Legal
Writing,U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-graduate-school/top-law-schools/legal-writing-rankings (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
128. Supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
129. For discussion of the substantive dimensions of law, see supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
130. For discussion of the structural dimensions of law, see supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
131. For discussion of the practical dimensions of law, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text. Before creation of the Legal Profession course, this greater emphasis
was also reflected in the Perspectives on Lawyering course that the Legal Profession course
replaced.
132. For discussion of the social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law, see
supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
133. Cf. Solomon, supra note 87, at 30 (after noting its "significant advantages,"
Solomon observes that "[Mercer's] program has its weaknesses. Although a block of
perspectives offerings are provided, the program appears deficient in the areas of theory
and policy. The question is one of balance. How much theory is relevant in a program
designed to train students for the general practice of law?"). For further discussion of this
point, see infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.

20121

LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION

1013

reintegrating all six sets of fundamental dimensions of law in a holistic
program of legal education aimed at formation of the "complete lawyer."
In so doing, it has honored the better traditions of U.S. legal education
established during the first phase in its historical development.
The vision of the Mercer lawyer animating the design of the Woodruff
Curriculum bears a striking resemblance to the ideal of the good and
practically wise lawyer. Preparing students to become liberally educated
lawyer-statesmen and stateswomen who possess practical wisdom and
civic-mindedness and who will serve their clients and the Republic by
acting in a properly broad-minded way is precisely what the Woodruff
Curriculum has sought to do since its inception. The priceless value of
achieving this goal can so easily be missed by law schools during their
anxious and frenetic scramble to rise in the U.S. News rankings. It can,
perhaps, only be captured in poetic imagery such as that used by
Anthony Kronman, a modern-day champion of the historic lawyerstatesman ideal: "IThose who see the ideal and seize the opportunity to
realize it in their own work will win for themselves a prize of infinite
value, like the sailor in a storm who manages, somehow, to save himself
and his ship's most precious cargo."a 4
III.

FORMING BROAD-MINDED LAWYERS-PERSPECTIVES COURSES IN
THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

It is just as imperative for legal educators today, as it was during the
first phase in the history of U.S. legal education, to help students
become lawyers possessing both practical wisdom and civic-mindedness.
And in pursuing this goal, it is just as imperative for legal educators
today, as it was during the first phase, to ensure that law students
receive a serious and sustained perspectives exposure to the social,
cultural, and transnational dimensions of law and lawyering.

134. KRONMAN, supra note 45, at 381. After carefully considering institutional
pressures within the legal academy, law firms, and the courts, and the associated rise of
competing and less compelling professional ideals within each, Kronman concludes that
"there is reason to believe that a small-town or small-city practice may provide a more
congenial setting" than other practice settings for those who wish to find the professional
identity and achieve the professional fulfillment that will come from living out the lawyerstatesman ideal; and he strongly implies that it is those law schools, such as Mercer, whose
students will mostly enter small-town or small-city practice, that are best positioned to
cultivate the lawyer-statesman ideal in their students. Id. at 368-81. For Kronman's
detailed analysis of the pertinent institutional pressures and associated rise of competing
ideals, see id. at 165-270 (law schools), 271-314 (law firms), 315-52 (courts). See also id. at
17-52 and 353-68 (for further elaboration of some of the competing ideals).
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A. Perspectives Subject Matter and Perspectives Courses in Professional Formation:Developing Technical Expertise and Qualities of
Character
We have already noted that restricting the term "perspectives" to the
type of subject matter and courses that address the social, cultural, and
transnational dimensions of law-courses such as law and economics,
legal history, jurisprudence, law, ethics and morality, comparative law,
international law, and so on-risks confirming the "neo-Langdellian
prejudice" that they are not concerned with "real law" but with
something external to real law."' It suggests, for many, that such
subject matter and such courses must be a waste of time and of no
importance to the practice of law. Nothing could be further from the
truth, however. They have very much to do with something internal,
inside the law, and they are of great utility in the practice of law.'36
At the heart of the "perspectives" experience is comparison. It may
consist, for example, of comparing our current legal experience with the
legal experience of those who lived in the past or with the legal
experience of those who live in other parts of the world or inhabit other
types of legal orders. Alternatively, it may involve comparing jurisprudential ideas about law with each other or with our own dominant
jurisprudential paradigm, or comparing the law, the legal system, and
legal behavior with forms of social ordering such as morality, religion,
politics, and economics." Such comparison enables the student to see

135. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Referring to such subject matter and
courses as being concerned with "law in context" or "lawyering in context" runs a similar
risk: the perception that such subject matter and such courses do not concern "real law,"
just "context." It also invites a similar solution, namely to realize that just as everything
is internal perspective, so also of course everything is internalcontext. See supranotes 25,
38 and accompanying text (explaining that each set and subset of fundamental dimensions-indeed each dimension-adds a level of context, reality, and meaning and enables the
other dimensions and any legal situation to be seen in broader perspective). Referring to
such subject matter and courses as being concerned with the "broader dimensions of law"
or the "broader dimensions of lawyering" makes the "internal" nature of such subject
matter and such courses clearer. However, such terminology may be somewhat inelegant.
137. It is this dimension of comparison that justifies characterizing courses addressing
various transnational dimensions of law as perspectives courses, at least when such
comparison is explicitly or implicitly central to the course. Thus, a course in International
Law would normally qualify, whereas a course in Immigration Law, for example, normally
would not. The former is primarily concerned with a radically different legal order from
that of the U.S. legal system; the latter is primarily concerned with a sub-specialty of U.S.
administrative law within that system. Where the aspect of comparison is more prominent,
however, as it certainly could be in an Immigration Law course that invites in-depth
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(or begin to see) the world of law and lawyering in all its vast richness
and diversity. It encourages a more holistic understanding of law and
lawyering and resists a trade school mentality that would reduce law
and lawyering to a matter of mechanical technique.""
Perspectives subject matter and courses are important in the
professional formation of the good lawyer because they address
important aspects of the holistic and multidimensional professional
context in which the various legal situations confronting the lawyer
occur.'39 They enable the lawyer to understand the context better, to
develop and draw upon the professional attributes necessary to engage
in good practical reasoning about ends and about means, and to respond
to the context appropriately.x'o A serious and sustained perspectives
exposure results in the acquisition and organization of detailed
knowledge in various knowledge domains.' 4 ' When appropriate, the
exploration of different cultures, such a course could justifiably be regarded as a
perspectives course as that term is used here. The same is true of other courses addressing
transnational dimensions, such as a course in International Business Transactions. A
typical course in European Union Law is a hybrid in this respect because it inherently has
both the feature of law governing international business transactions and the dimension
of comparative legal ordering.
138. Of course, in a sense, the perspectives experience is not unique in involving
comparison. Comparison is central to analogical reasoning, and analogical reasoning is
central to all practical reasoning, in the law and elsewhere, and indeed to reasoning in
general, and thus, in this sense, to all knowledge domains. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN
ET AL., THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAw 366, 369 (5th ed., 1996).

The most pervasive form of legal logic is that of analogy, in the broad sense of the
comparison and contrast of similar and dissimilar examples.... Analogical
reasoning is, of course, a universal mode of reasoning and by no means unique to
law. What is distinctive about law, in this respect, is the degree of emphasis
placed upon the use of analogy and the development of special legal rules,
procedures, and methods for drawing analogies.
Id. The authors distinguish their broader use of the term "analogy" from the narrower,
more technical use of the term, "signifying the extension of a legal category to a situation
which is 'similar to,' but not 'the same as' those situations which the category 'logically'
includes." Id. at 366. What is unique about the perspectives experience, then, are the
additionaltypes of comparison involved.
139. For a discussion of that holistic and multidimensional context, see Part LA above.
140. For a discussion of those professional attributes, see Part I.C above.
141. See Jones, Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 612-17 (discussing how
detailed knowledge is organized in various knowledge structures in the mind-schemas,
scripts, cognitive maps, and paradigms-that are integrated with each other and with other
knowledge structures). It is important to note that, because the good lawyer has become
a particular kind of person, the lawyer will usually "adapt" or "refract" or "inflect" or
"modulate" the knowledge gained in the perspectives exposure into a profession-specific
form within the practice of the profession, and the knowledge structures in the mind will
of course reflect this. Thus, when influenced by knowledge of economics or moral
philosophy, for example, the lawyer is "thinking like a lawyer," not simply as an economist
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good lawyer can then draw upon this organized knowledge to respond to
the context of the particular legal situation in an effective and efficient
manner. A serious and sustained perspectives exposure not only shapes
what the lawyer knows; it also shapes what the lawyer does and who the
lawyer is. 42
1. Technical Expertise-Utilizing the "Sources of Law" in DecisionMaking
Perspectives courses are of critical practical value in helping to
develop students' technical expertise and thus prepare them for the
competent practice of law. Such courses explore important sources in the
"seamless web of the law." To make persuasive arguments, students
need to acquire knowledge of these sources and skill in handling them.
a. Sources of Law as Causal Factors in ProducingLegal Outcomes
The six sets of fundamental dimensions of law represent different
types of "sources of law,"""3 meaning that they represent different
kinds of human influences'" that operate as causal factors in producing legal outcomes.' 4 5 The ultimate outcome in any given legal situation is the result of a series of decisions made by relevant legal actors.
The lawyer's goal in this process is to produce an ultimate legal outcome
6
that responds appropriately to the particular context of the client.14

or a philosopher.
142. In the ensuing discussion, it is important to remember that the lawyer's
substantive knowledge, practical skills, and qualities of character are seamlessly
integrated, systemically pervasive, and mutually interactive professional attributes. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text. Thus, in practice, the lawyer's technical expertise
and the lawyer's character are necessarily interdependent.
143. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
144. The restriction of the fundamental dimensions taxonomy to human influences
explains why there is no set of fundamental dimensions dealing with the physical or
material dimensions of law, such as geography or climate, even though such factors can
have a significant impact upon a legal system.
145. That aspect of an exploration of the social dimensions of law which examines the
behavioral or social effects of law concerns "sources of law" in the sense of law-related
sources that are a source or cause of such effects as opposed to other types of sources
/causes of those effects.
146. For a more extensive analysis of how the multiplicity of causal factors or "sources"
related to the six sets of fundamental dimensions of law may directly or indirectly influence
legal outcomes, see Jones, Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 597-601. The good
lawyer must be able to identify, process, and frequently manipulate this multiplicity of
causal factors when making, evaluating, and influencing the various decisions that produce
the ultimate legal outcome.
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The comparison at the heart of the perspectives experience147 may
take one of two forms when informing the lawyer's practical reasoning
during this process. First, the lawyer can compare domestic law-related
norms and reasoning with the norms and reasoning of the various
knowledge domains related to the social, cultural, and transnational
dimensions of law. In certain cases this type of comparison results in, or
occurs in the process of, directly applying the norms and reasoning of
another knowledge domain (international law or foreign law or historical
law, for example). Second, the lawyer can compare and evaluate the
consequences of decisions in terms of the norms and reasoningof several
of these knowledge domains. In this instance, the lawyer may compare
and evaluate the consequences of alternative decisions in terms of the
norms and reasoning of a specific knowledge domain (economics or
psychology, for example), or the lawyer may compare and evaluate the
consequences of a particular decision in terms of the norms and
reasoning of different knowledge domains (economics and morality, for
example)."' The lawyer will use the insights gained to make decisions
and to evaluate and influence decisions made by other legal actors in a
manner appropriate to the context. Depending on the particular
situation and the lawyer's particular function and role, these other legal
actors may include judges, juries, legislators, administrative officials,
other parties, other lawyers, and the client.
b.

Litigation and Judicial Decision-Making
In litigation, the competent lawyer must be able to understand and
evaluate the law and make arguments that will persuade the court to
render a decision favorable to the lawyer's client. This requires the
lawyer to address those "sources of law" that may operate as causal
factors in producing the court's decision. H.L.A. Hart proposes a
tripartite taxonomy that provides one way to think about the "sources
of law" or causal factors that explain a court's decision. In his classic
book The Concept of Law, Hart distinguishes among three kinds of
sources of law, giving examples of each:
147. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
148. Sometimes the first type of comparison will also incorporate the second type of
comparison as an element (for example, when an evaluation of the applicability of foreign
law requires consideration of the consequences of legal rules in the domestic and/or foreign
legal system through proper use of the comparative method). Regarding the comparison of
economics and morality, I recognize that moral premises are implicit, and sometimes
explicit, in law and economics analysis. However, law and economics analysis has achieved
such extensive influence that it is commonly regarded as an independent knowledge
domain or "school of thought" separate from morality (or, alternatively, from the rest of
morality).
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(1) Mandatory or binding legal sources ("formal" sources), which are "the
criteria of legal validity accepted in the legal system in question" (for
example, enactment by a legislature, customary practice, or precedent);
(2) Permissive or persuasive legal sources, which provide "good reasons"
for decision "lw]here [a judge] considers that no statute or other formal
source of law determines the case before him" (for example, a text of the
Digest, or the writings of a French jurist); and
(3) Historical or material sources, which are "the causal or historical
influences which account for the existence of a given rule of law at a
given time or place" (for example, rules of Roman law or Canon law or
rules of popular morality). 4 '
Clearly, the competent lawyer must be able to identify, process, and
manipulate the sources or "causal factors" in the first category in order
to be able to make persuasive arguments and influence the reasoning of
the court. Though perhaps not obvious, the first category of sources
includes international and foreign law. International law is a directly
binding source of law in the U.S. legal system to the extent that common
law rules and constitutional provisions mandate its application.5 o
Foreign law is binding in U.S. courts to the extent that a court's choiceof-law methodology calls for the application of foreign law; moreover,
foreign law must be consulted whenever a binding source of U.S. law
expressly refers to or implicates foreign law.'' International law and
foreign law are sources of law that originate in very different and
unfamiliar types of legal order-types requiring distinctive kinds of
knowledge and specialized skills.
Hart's two examples of sources in the second category demonstrate the
value of a familiarity with legal history (a text of the Digest) and
comparative law (the writings of a French jurist)."' In an essay

149. H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 246-47 (1961).
150. For a good, concise discussion of the complex issues involved in the "incorporation"
of international law into U.S. domestic law, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS (3d ed. 2010), at 163-66 (customary international law), 171-79 (international
treaties). See also id. at 161-63 (relationship to constitutional law norms).
151. See, e.g., MATTEI ET AL., supra note 25, at 53-56 (examining the "myriad and often
complex ways [in which] the U.S. legal system interacts with the legal systems of other
countries" and explaining that "[olne of the tasks of comparative law is to promote
comprehension and proper application of this important part of U.S. law").
152. The Digest is part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, the great "codification" of Roman
Law promulgated by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian in four parts (the Institutes, the
Digest, the Codex, and the Novellae) in the fourth decade of the sixth century. It is a
compilation of excerpts from various writings of thirty-nine Roman jurists, mostly from the
period between 100 C.E and 250 C.E., and especially from the writings of Ulpian and Paul.
Following its rediscovery in the medieval West at the end of the eleventh century, it was
intensively studied by generations of scholars and lies at the foundation of the Western
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published elsewhere, Hart elaborates on this category of sources and
provides other examples of relevant sources:
It is of crucial importance that cases for decision do not arise in a
vacuum but in the course of the operation of a working body of rules,
an operation in which a multiplicity of diverse considerations are
continuously recognized as good reasons for a decision. These include
a wide variety of individual and social interests, social and political
aims, and standards of morality and justice; and they may be formulated in general terms as principles, policies and standards. In some cases
only one such consideration may be relevant, and it may determine
decision as unambiguously as a determinate legal rule. But in many
cases this is not so, and judges marshal in support of their decisions a
plurality of such considerations which they regard as jointly sufficient
to support their decision, although each separately would not be.
Frequently these considerations conflict, and courts are forced to
balance or weigh them and to determine priorities among them.2"'

legal tradition. For further discussion of the creation of the Corpus Juris and of the
influence of the Digest in Western legal history, see, for example, BARRY NICHOLAs, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 38-54 (1962).
153. H. L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 107 (1983). For further

discussion of the role of specifically moral argument in judicial reasoning and decisionmaking and the character of the judicial audience that is the object of the lawyer's
attempts to persuade, see HART, supra note 149, at 200:
Laws require interpretation if they are to be applied in concrete cases, and . .. it
is patent ... that the open texture of law leaves a vast field for a creative activity
which some call legislative. Neither in interpreting statutes nor precedents are
judges confined to the alternatives of blind, arbitrary choice, or "mechanical"
deduction from rules with predetermined meaning. Very often their choice is
guided by an assumption that the purpose of the rules which they are interpreting
is a reasonable one, so that the rules are not intended to work injustice or offend
settled moral principles. Judicial decision, especially on matters of high
constitutional import, often involves a choice between moral values, and not
merely the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for it is folly to
believe that where the meaning of the law is in doubt, morality always has a clear
answer to offer. At this point judges may again make a choice which is neither
arbitrary nor mechanical; and here often display characteristic judicial virtues, the
special appropriateness of which to legal decision explains why some feel reluctant
to call such judicial activity "legislative." These virtues are: impartiality and
neutrality in surveying the alternatives; consideration for the interest of all who
will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle as a
reasoned basis for decision. No doubt because a plurality of such principles is
always possible it cannot be demonstratedthat a decision is uniquely correct: but

it may be made acceptable as the reasoned product of informed impartial choice.

In all this we have the "weighing" and "balancing" characteristic of the effort to
do justice between competing interests.
Id.
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Hart's examples relate to different sources of law that represent different
knowledge domains, and each demands a distinctive type of knowledge
and specialized skills."'4
As mere "causal or historical influences" accounting for the existence
of a given rule, sources in the third category-historical or material
sources-are of no rhetorical value to the lawyer. However, sources in this
third category may well have originated in the second category.
Consider, for example, the persuasive normative force of popular
morality or economic policy. The competent lawyer will know when and
how to manipulate this third category of sources when making or
addressing arguments related to the second category of sources and
reopening questions perhaps considered long settled. In effect, the lawyer
seeks to move these sources back into the second category for possible
reconsideration. This is a further demonstration, of course, of the value
of a familiarity with legal history.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the value of perspectives
subject matter and courses for understanding legal doctrine in greater
depth and for developing and using five of the skills identified by the
MacCrate Report-legal reasoning,' 5 legal research,156 factual investi-

154. In addition to historical law and foreign law, therefore, good reasons persuading
a court may be found in jurisprudential analysis, or moral reasoning, or policy considerations relating to economics or other societal interests. In addition, the formulation and
impact of such reasons may also be dependent upon the lawyer's understanding and
manipulation of relevant psychological factors. Regarding the utility of a familiarity with
major jurisprudential schools and movements when crafting certain types of legal
argument, see, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 221-41 (2003).
155. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 151-55 (Skill 2: Legal Analysis and
Reasoning). The Report analyses this Skill as involving the identification and formulation
of legal issues, the formulation of relevant legal theories, the elaboration of legal theory,
the evaluation of legal theory, and criticizing and synthesizing legal argumentation. Id.
These tasks are invariably performed under the influence of one or more jurisprudential
paradigms. Regarding other types of "perspectives," see id. at 153 (Skill 2.3: Elaborating
Legal Theory, which also entails "skills and concepts involved in elaborating and enhancing
legal theories," including identifying and analyzing "arguments in different dimensions
(such as, for example, doctrine, history, practicality, justice and equity), that can be
brought to bear to support (or oppose) the legal theories that have been formulated"), 15456 (Skill 2.5: Criticizing and Synthesizing Legal Argumentation, which also entails "skills
and concepts involved in ... [ciritically examining the legal 'rules' on which the theories
and arguments are based, putting these rules into perspective in the light of their
purposes, derivations, the circumstances under which they were announced, and so forth
...

[and] [an evaluation of potential flaws in reasoning, including ...

[q]uestionable

applications of inductive or deductive logic"). See also id. at 213-15 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (Value 2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality, which also
entails "[clontributing to the [pirofession's [flulfillment of its [rlesponsibility to [elnhance
the [clapacity of [1]aw and [llegal [i]nstitutions to [d]o [jiustice," including through
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gation, 15 7 communication,"' and litigation." The use of international and foreign law in constitutional cases before the United States
Supreme Court offers a striking example of the potential value of
becoming familiar with the knowledge domains represented by these
various types of sources of law. In particular, the majority opinion in
Roper v. Simmons60 unwittingly demonstrates the pitfalls of proceeding without a proper familiarity with international and comparative law.
In this case a five-member majority of the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court setting aside the
death sentence of a defendant who was under eighteen at the time the
relevant offence was committed.16 1 After discussing several international conventions prohibiting the execution of juveniles, as well as

endeavoring to change legal rules that are not "just, understandable, and responsive to the
needs of society").
156. Id. at 159 (Skill 3: Legal Research, which also entails familiarity with "[tiechniques of reading and analyzing court decisions").
157. Id. at 167 (Skill 4: Factual Investigation, which also entails "[an understanding
of the basic communication processes and interpersonal dynamics involved in interviewing"
and application of that understanding in ascertaining and responding appropriately to a
"witness's motivations" as well as "atten[ding] to, and correctly interpreting, verbal and
nonverbal communications" when conducting interviews), 172 (Commentary to Skill 4,
explaining that, in addition to interviewing of fact witnesses and analysis of documents,
"foither forms of investigation may call upon the lawyer to employ other skills and perhaps
also other substantive knowledge. For example, lawyers often have to gather facts about
technological or scientific matters. . . ."); see also id. at 208, 210, 219 (identifying the
acquisition of substantive knowledge regarding relevant fields and disciplines other than
law as part of Value 1: Provision of Competent Representation and Value 4: Professional
Self-Development).
158. Id. at 173-75 (Skill 5: Communication, which also requires an awareness of how
"[ain insufficient understanding of the other person's culture, personal values, or attitudes"
can impede the ability to view relevant matters from the perspective of the recipient of the
communication (for example, client, decisionmaker(s), opposing counsel, witnesses, and so
forth), attending to relevant "emotional or interpersonal factors," and "effectively tailoring
the nature, form, or content of the written or oral communication to suit . .. [tihe
[particular] audience. . . .").
159. Id. at 192-93, 195 (Skill 8: Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures, which also entails the skills and processes involved in the formulation,
evaluation, and critique of legal theories at the trial court level and the skills and
techniques required for effective brief writing, including the factors and processes to
consider in making arguments, at the appellate level); see also id. at 194 (evaluating "[t]he
extent to which a jury may be swayed by emotional factors prejudicial to the client"), 197
(noting, with regard to alternative dispute resolution, the importance of familiarity with
"[tihe sources of norms that govern or guide decisionmaking in the various mechanisms (for
example, substantive legal doctrines, industry conventions, equitable considerations")).
160. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
161. Id. at 578-79.
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individual countries' foreign law or public declarations, the Court
concluded as follows:
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part
on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of
young people may often be a factor in the crime.. . . The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
162
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.
Writing in dissent, Justice O'Connor conceded that "[viery few, if any,
countries other than the United States now permit this practice in law
or in fact" and that "the international community has reached clear
agreement-expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of
individual countries-that [this] particular form of punishment is
inconsistent with fundamental human rights."'63 She also allowed for
the possibility that "the existence of an international consensus of this
nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and
genuine American consensus."" She dissented, however, because, in
her view, there was "no such domestic consensus."6 s
The case is a striking example of the potential value of the second
category of "sources of law" for lawyers seeking to persuade a court to
rule in the client's favor.6 6 It is also a striking example of how not to
do this well. Thus, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion exposes the
majority's and Justice O'Connor's lack of sophistication in handling
international and foreign sources.' 7 He cogently argues that if one is

162. Id. at 578. The Court concluded that in light of "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society" as manifested in state legislation and state
practice in the United States, as well as salient differences between adults and juveniles
under eighteen, imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders is disproportionate
punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 560-75 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
163. Id. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 605.
165. Id.
166. The case does not mustrate the role of the first category of sources because the
United States had either not ratified, or it had entered relevant reservations to, the
international conventions in question, and thus the rules in those conventions could not
apply directly as a binding source of law for the Court.
167. Id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined in Justice Scalia's dissent). Justice Scalia's greater sophistication in this respect is
ironic, because his originalist theory of constitutional interpretation precludes him from
ever considering international and foreign law as a "source of law" in the second category
of sources in constitutional cases (except, of course, for "old English law" as he has wryly
explained). See, e.g., U.S. Ass'n of Constitutional Law, American University Washington
College of Law, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, C-SPAN (Jan. 13,
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going to regard foreign law as a persuasive "good reason," one should at
least look beyond the black letter law or black letter statements by
foreign governments."' A comparison of foreign to domestic legal
materials is only meaningful if the foreign materials are handled in the
same multi-contextual manner as domestic materials need to be handled.
To be sure the majority nods in this direction with its observation that
international opinion against the death penalty "rest[s] in large part on
the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young
people may often be a factor in the crime.""' Justice Scalia rightly
emphasizes, however, the importance of undertaking a more extensive
exploration of context for a proper understanding and a proper
comparison. He maintains, for example, that the Court should have
inquired whether countries that have prohibited the death penalty for
juveniles have a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes,17 o
whether countries that have abolished the death penalty on paper have
actually done so in practice,and whether there are distinctive American
values justifying a distinctively American answer to the question of the
legitimacy of sentencing juveniles to death.17' By any measure, the
majority's use of international and foreign law was naively superficial
and unlawyerly.172

2005), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/185122-1 (colloquy between Justice Breyer and
Justice Scalia), at 33-35 minutes.
168. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 578 (majority opinion); see also supranote 162 and accompanying text. This
represents an explicit nod in the direction of the social dimensions of law and perhaps an
implicit nod in the direction of the jurisprudential dimensions as well.
170. In contrast to the United States in which a jury may decide not to impose the
death penalty.
171. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, in making these three
points, he calls for a further inquiry into, respectively, the substantive and structural
dimensions, the socio-legal world or "law in action" within the social dimensions, and the
social, historical, and jurisprudential dimensions.
172. Justice Scalia contends that the Court is not engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry" because, as he sees it, the Court is willing "[tlo invoke alien law
when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise" (as demonstrated, for
example, by the Court's apparent unwillingness to let "the views of foreigners" influence
its jurisprudence on such matters as the interpretation of the establishment clause in the
context of public education, abortion on demand before viability, the exclusionary rule, the
prohibition on double jeopardy, and the scope of the right to jury trial in criminal cases,
even though United States law on these matters is significantly aberrational). Id. at 62427.
Arguably, the actual result would have been no different in the end, even using Justice
Scalia's improved comparative methodology. For example, perhaps the majority could have
found a "Western consensus" against the death penalty for juveniles (there being no issue
regarding possible differences between the stated position and actual practice with regard

1024

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

b. Decision-Making in Other Contexts
Hart's tripartite taxonomy of "sources of law" is helpful in thinking
about decision-making in other contexts as well. For example, with
regard to legislative law reform efforts, Hart's first category of sources
is represented by relevant norms of constitutional law and other sources
that bind the legislature and act as constraints on its discretion.'73
Within these constraints, the legislature has much more freedom to act
with respect to existing statutory or common law norms than does a
court. Accordingly, there is even more scope for the competent lawyer to
manipulate the types of sources in Hart's second category of sources
when making arguments and providing "good reasons" aimed at
persuading the legislature rather than a court."' As in the case of
judicial decision-making, the competent lawyer will also know when and
how to manipulate the "causal or historical influences" in the third
category of sources that account for the existing law.7 5
As the competent lawyer seeks to influence decision-making in the
legislature (or rulemaking in administrative agencies), the value of
perspectives subject matter and courses for developing and using the
MacCrate Report's skills of legal research, factual investigation, and
communication should be apparent. 7 ' The authors of a leading

to Western nations) and, after examining the social and cultural contexts of the United
States and other Western nations, might have concluded that there were no relevant
differences in these contexts justifying American exceptionalism on this particularissue.
Even so, the example the majority sets by using an inferior methodology is not a good one.
173. These other sources include international law and, at the state level, federal law
as well.
174. Once again, those reasons maybe based on historical or jurisprudential analysis,
non-binding international or foreign law, moral reasoning, or policy considerations relating
to economics or other societal interests, and again may involve any relevant psychological
factors.
175. The process of administrative rulemaking can be similarly analyzed, except that
the first category of legal sources now includes the governing statute and binding case-law.
176. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 157-58 (Skill 3: Legal Research, stating that
the lawyer requires an understanding of the variety of legal remedies available in the
particular situation, including "legislative remedies (such as drafting and/or lobbying for
new legislation; lobbying to defeat pending legislative bills; and lobbying for the repeal or
amendment of existing legislation); administrative remedies (such as presenting testimony
in support of, or lobbying for, the adoption, repeal, or amendment of administrative
regulations; and lobbying of an administrator to resolve an individual case in a particular
way"); see also id. at 213, 215 (Value 3: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality,
which also includes "[clontributing to the [pirofession's [flulfillment of its [riesponsibility
to [einhance the [clapacity of [1law and [llegal [ilnstitutions to [d]o jlustice," including
through legislative reform and other reform efforts). Regarding the skills of factual
investigation and communication, see supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text
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comparative law casebook rightly observe that it is puzzling why "law
reforming agencies throughout the United States so often fail to avail
themselves of the advantages of the comparative method. A list of
missed opportunities of this kind would be boringly long if it were
compiled.""' As one comparativist wrote almost a century ago:
When one is immersed in his own law, in his own country, unable to
see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable tendency
to consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God, things which are
simply due to historical accident or temporary social situation.. .. To
see things in their true light, we must see them from a certain
distance, as strangers, which is impossible when we study ...
phenomena of our own country. That is why comparative law should
be one of the necessary elements in the training of all those who are to
shape the law for societies. . . .178
If the insight behind this powerful statement is properly understood, the
statement logically applies to all perspectives subject matter and
courses, not just comparative law. All of them enable those engaged in
the various aspects of the legal process "[t]o see things in their true
light."179
The preceding discussion applies analogously to decision-making
involved in applying or reforming other types of public or quasi-public
normative orderings as well. Consider, for example, the norms of
professional responsibility 8 o or the norms governing legal educa-

respectively. The targets of lobbying efforts may be bodies within the legislature (legislative
committees and commissions, for example) or those informing the legislative process from
outside the legislature (industry or consumer lobbying groups, for example).
177. MA'rEI ET AL., supranote 25, at 145-52 (discussing the use of comparative studies
by the New York Law Revision Commission and contrasting the provincialism of most
other law reform efforts in the United States). Of course, as the authors illustrate in their
discussion, proper use of the comparative method to inform legislative law reform requires
sufficient attention to possible differences in context, just as it does in judicial decisionmaking. Id.; see also id. at 242-44 (discussing the routine use of comparative studies to
inform legislative law reform in continental Europe and Great Britain and indeed most
other common law countries, and recognizing that in the United States "examination of the
laws of fifty-three American jurisdictions imposes a heavy load on the legislative draftsman
even without the study of foreign materials" but also noting that "there is some indication
that comparative studies have become more frequent than they once were as a prelude to
law reform").
178. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838, 858
(1922), as quoted in MATTEI ET AL., supra note 25, at 242 n.34.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2010), available at http://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/model-rules-ofLprofessional-con
duct/model_rules_ofLprofessional conduct_table ofcontents.html.
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tion.'ei Such norms are analogous to the first category of sources in
Hart's tripartite taxonomy. As with Hart's second category of sources,
good reasons for making decisions or persuading other relevant
decisionmakers in applying or reforming these norms may be derived
from perspectives subject matter. For example, moral reasoning is
valuable in applying indeterminate rules of professional conduct, 82
and comparative studies have proven valuable in suggesting possible
reforms in legal education."a As with Hart's third category of sources,

181. These norms are part of the "structural dimensions of law" within the fundamental
dimensions of law taxonomy. They include "external"nationally applicable substantive and
procedural norms, such as the ABA Standards governing the operation of accredited law
schools. See Am. Bar Ass'n, 2011-12 Standardsand Rules ofProcedurefor Approval ofLaw
Schools (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
misc/legaLeducation/Standards/ 2011_2012_standards_and_rules_forweb.authcheckdam
.pdf. They also include the "internal" substantive and procedural norms governing the
detailed structure and content of the education provided by a particular law school within
that externally derived framework. The norms governing legal education are mentioned in
connection with the present discussion on the preparation of competent lawyers because
the practicing Bar is, and should be, part of the conversation regarding the appropriate
structure and content of legal education, as is demonstrated by the role of the ABA in
accrediting law schools, past ABA studies, such as the MacCrate Report and Professionalism Committee Report, and ongoing discussions within the ABA and between the ABA
and the AALS regarding accreditation standards. Consequently, it seems legitimate to
regard the attempts of the practicing Bar to influence decision-making regarding legal
education as also requiring and implicating lawyer competence, not just the competence
of legal educators.
182. See MACORATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 204-05 (Skill 10: Recognizing and
Resolving Ethical Dilemmas, which also entails being familiar with "[aspects of ethical
philosophy bearing upon the propriety of particular practices or conduct (such as, for
example, general ethical precepts calling for honesty, integrity, courtesy and respect for
others; general ethical prohibitions against lying and misrepresentation)" and bringing the
lawyer's personal sense of morality and capacity for self-scrutiny to bear in questioning,
researching, and seeking guidance regarding various practices).
183. See, e.g., STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16 (drawing extensively
upon the approaches to legal education in other countries, especially the training of
solicitors in England and Wales, in its analyses and recommendations). For example, the
authors address a feature of U.S. legal education that commonly strikes lawyers trained
in other countries as bizarre to say the least. Noting that only Vermont and Delaware
require some period of practice experience before lawyers are fully licensed, the authors call
for more states to follow the lead of these two states, observing that "We believe the public
would be better served by a process that begins sooner, lasts longer, and includes a
mandatory period of supervised practice before full admission to the legal profession,
perhaps adapted from the best traditions of British Commonwealth jurisdictions." Id. at
12-13; see also id. at 149-57 (elaborating upon the value of a period of supervised practice,
such as that required of an English solicitor or barrister before full licensure, in cultivating
the lawyer's practical wisdom). As a lawyer trained as a barrister in England, and subject
to the usual caveats regarding the importance of being alert to relevant differences in
context, it is difficult for me to disagree with the authors' contentions regarding the value
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the competent lawyer will also know when and how to manipulate the
"causal or historical influences" that account for the existence of the
norms.
The discussion also has a bearing on decision-making involved in
counseling clients or in representing them in dispute resolution
negotiations or transactional negotiations.'" There is an analogy to
Hart's first category of sources of law in the norms of private ordering
that may govern the situation," and as with Hart's second category
of sources, good reasons for making decisions or persuading other
relevant decision makers in creating, applying, or reforming these norms
may be derived from perspectives subject matter. Among other things,
economics, business practice, moral reasoning, game theory, or psychology may come into play. As with Hart's third category of sources, the
competent lawyer will also know when and how to manipulate the
"causal or historical influences" that account for the existing norms of
private ordering. Once again, we see the value of perspectives subject
matter and courses for developing and using various skills identified by
the MacCrate Report, such as problem solving," factual investigation,1s communication,'as counseling,s' and negotiation.xo Such
of a mandatory period of supervised practice before full admission.
184. Because the competent lawyer must always keep the potential of possible litigation
in mind and therefore have regard to how a judge might ultimately decide a matter, the
above discussion ofjudicial decision-making is also relevant. See MACORATE REPORT, supra
note 12, at 157 (Commentary to Skill 2: Legal Analysis and Reasoning, noting that in a
wide variety of contexts beyond "decisionmakers in the traditional litigative sense of a
judge, jury, or other neutral arbiter.... an individual or an organization is in a position
to make decisions affecting the client, and a lawyer may need to use legal reasoning to
gauge the best possible approach for dealing with that individual or organization. This is
true, for example, in the negotiation of a commercial transaction, where legal reasoning
may inform a lawyer's approach to the party with whom he or she is negotiating.").
Regarding the potential for ADR decision-making, see supra text accompanying note 159
(discussing Skill 8: Litigation and Alternative Dispute-Resolution Procedures).
185. For example, a contract between the lawyer and the client, a contract between the
parties, or a testator's will.
186. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 142, 146, 150 (Skill 1: Problem Solving,
emphasizing a "holistic approach to the assessment of a client's situation" that has regard
to non-legal factors involved in "[t]he legal, institutional, and interpersonal frameworks in
which the problem is set," the need to evaluate whether to seek expertise in "fields other
than law," and the "skill of creativity"that is crucial for the skill of problem solving, as well
as "virtually all of the skills analyzed in the Statement," and that entails having "a creative
mind" that is "willing to look at situations, ideas, and issues in an openminded way; to
explore novel and imaginative approaches; and to look for potentially useful connections
and associations between apparently unrelated principles ... facts . . . negotiating points
...

or other factors").

187. See id. at 172 (emphasizing that the skill of factual investigation is relevant for
"a wide range of contexts and types of decsionmak[ing]"); see also supra text accompanying
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subject matter and courses are also valuable for developing and using
the administrative skills necessary for the organization and management
of legal work."'1
d. Some Additional Perspectives
The coverage and treatment in two books devoted to addressing
perspectives subject matter warrant relatively detailed consideration
here because they provide greater insight into the nature of such
material and its value in helping lawyers make sound decisions and
evaluate and influence decisions by others. The first book, Bailey Kuklin
and Jeffrey Stempel's Foundationsof the Law: An Interdisciplinaryand
JurisprudentialPrimer,contains chapters on: ethical theory and the law;
law and economics; political philosophy and law; American governmental
structure: its impact on law; law, dispute resolution, and the adversary
system; and historical, jurisprudential, and multidisciplinary influences

note 157 (discussing Skill 4: Factual Investigation).
188. See id. at 172 (emphasizing that "[1]awyers employ communicative skills-including
both written and oral forms of communication-in a wide variety of ways and in a wide
range of contexts . .. includ[ing] ...

to advocate or persuade (such as, for example, . . .

bargaining with an adversary); to advise or inform (for example, opinion letters to a client;
orally counseling or giving legal advice to a client; briefing a senior partner); to elicit
information (for example, interviews of clients or witnesses ... .); and to establish legal
obligations or effectuate legal transactions. . . ."); see also supra text accompanying note
158 (discussing Skill 5: Communication).
189. See id. at 177-85 (Skill 6: Counseling), especially at 177, 181-82, 184 (Skill 6.1
(aXiii), 6.4 (d)(iv), and Commentary, stressing the need to attend to "considerations of
justice, fairness, or morality" within the framework set by ethical standards, including
attempting to persuade the client to accommodate these considerations, taking action to
protect third parties or the general public, or withdrawing from representation), 177-78,
179, 181 (Skill 6.1 (b)(i), 6.2 (c)(iii), and 6.4 (dXii), identifying the importance of being
sensitive to emotional reactions, interpersonal factors, and cultural differences), 182 (Skill
6.4(d)(v), recognizing that effective counseling may require the lawyer to give non-legal
advice, such as "business advice or personal advice"); see also id. at 184 (Commentary to
Skill 6, referring to Value 2), 213-14 (Value 2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and
Morality, including the need to take justice, fairness, and morality into account, within the
framework set by the ethical rules, when counseling clients or making decisions on their
behalf).
190. See id. at 185-90 (Skill 7: Negotiation), especially at 187, 190 (Skill 7.1 (e)(i) and
Commentary, recognizing the importance of certain aspects of "negotiation theory" and the
additional value of "game theory models, economic models, and social-psychological
bargaining theories"), 188 (Skill 7.1 (f)(i), recognizing the importance of factoring in various
attributes of the other attorney including "personality").
191. A familiarity with such matters as economics, business practice, moral reasoning,
and psychology would seem to be particularly valuable. See generally id. at 199-203 (Skill
9: Organization and Management of Legal Work).
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on law. 9 2 In a companion article discussing their reasons for writing
the book, the authors state:
Although students cannot be expected to begin with enough law and
legal history to maintain a critical perspective in the face of the
portrayed certainty of assigned cases, students with some background
in the underlying factors of the law and some analytic insight can
arrive at their own criticism and assessments once they become
confident enough to believe they can. Armed with sufficient tools,
students can learn to become the discerning critics that classic legal
education has been assumed to produce. Adequately grounded, students
can do more than reproduce legal doctrine and internal debates about
law, they can learn to advance beyond the conclusory rhetorical force
of the cases. They can learn-as can we-to continue meaningful
conversation in the face of well-placed "whys?." Not forever, of course,
as the postmodernists insist, for ultimately Santayana's aphorism
prevails at a point calling for active choice rather than a passive,
necessary conclusion (e.g., "because the law here subscribes to
utilitarian reasoning"). But at this point the students are in a position
to broadly survey the entire legal terrain, if not its as-yet-unlearned
structures, perceiving its breadth and depth, and understanding why
legal reason ends where it does.
We felt strongly enough about this view to write a book supporting
it, one that contends law today is dramatically molded by our learning
regarding ethics, economics, political theory, American government
structure, the adversary system, and (not surprisingly) jurisprudential
movements. Therefore, we argue, most legal subjects can be effectively
analyzed by reference to this broader legal learning. Because it reveals
the pervasive forces molding the law, making the law more explicable,
predictable and coherently moldable, we believe that law schools owe
it to their students to ensure that they are all exposed to these basic
foundational concepts. Assessing legal outcomes according to only, or
even primarily, a decision's internal consistency and relation to
precedent and statute eliminates too much potential for teaching
students to become discerning consumers of law rather than merely
vessels for absorbing legal runoff. In particular, the standard case and
problem methods of classroom instruction will be enriched by injecting
foundational considerations and critique.

192. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER (1994). Although two of these chapters,

on the American governmental structure and on the adversary system, might appear to be
more concerned with the structural dimensions of law than with the social or cultural
dimensions, the authors' approach is historical, jurisprudential, and comparative and is
thus focused on the cultural dimensions of the governmental structure and the adversary
system.
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Embracing multidisciplinary perspectives, as an instrument, when
closely examining course material cuts two ways. In one direction, the
instrument is a microscope through which students will gain deeper
insight into the law in general and specific issues. In the other
direction, by looking through the instrument from the vantage point of
the legal materials, it becomes a telescope through which the students
will gain deeper insight into the nature and reach of these multidisciplinary materials. By struggling with the merits of a complex issue,
students will better master the tools provided by ethics, economics,
political theory, governmental structure, dispute resolution, jurisprudence, etc. Then, the comprehensive study becomes a two-way street.
In both directions, the road leads to greater knowledge and understanding. m
The authors clearly believe that such knowledge and understanding will
lead to improved legal outcomes. In their view, students become better
"able to retain and use the law more effectively while evaluating the
legal products with greater sophistication, thereby being better prepared
to become law producers as well.""
Kuklin and Stempel proceed from the premise, then, that "[elthical,
economic, political, governmental, structural, historical, sociological,
psychological and jurisprudential currents energize the law from top to
bottom, side to side, inside and out."'95 In the Teacher's Manual to
their book, they detail, chapter by chapter, how the material "might best
be interwoven with commonly offered law courses, paying particular
attention to recurring issues in the law school and legal studies curriculum."96

193. Bailey Kuklin & Jeffrey W. Stempel, ContinuingClassroom Conversation Beyond
the Well-Placed "Whys?", 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 59, 60-61 (1997) (footnotes omitted). The
authors invoke the aphorism "Four well-placed 'whys? will stop any conversation," noting
that it is attributed to George Santayana. Id. at 59 n.1.
194. Id. at 65.
195. Id. at 66.
196. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAw: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER: TEACHER'S MANUAL 9 (1994). Before this

chapter-by-chapter discussion, however, they provide the following illuminating overview
of the value of these perspectives in different areas of law:
The background provided in the book will give students additional perspective
for "decoding" reported cases, statutes, and seeming inconsistencies in the law
throughout the curriculum and in their future work.
Notwithstanding thlisl versatility .. . certain chapters in the book will be more
apt for particular courses than others:
Chapter One, Ethical Theory and the Law, will be valuable reading for any
jurisprudentially oriented course. It should have particular application to legal
process, introduction to law or other initial courses in legal reasoning. It also has
relevance for any course where issues of morality and justice are "front and
center" in the curriculum, such as criminal law, criminal justice studies, and
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The second book, David Crump's How to Reason About the Law: An
InterdisciplinaryApproachto the FoundationsofPublicPolicy, addresses
almost all the subjects addressed by Kuklin and Stempel and several
others they do not address.'97 In his introduction the author explains
the contents and purpose of the book:
This book is a kind of "thinker's tool kit" for law students. It is a

guide to clear legal reasoning.

public welfare law. In our view, however, justice issues should be addressed to
some degree in all basic law courses.
Chapter Two, Law and Economics, also has wide application. To the extent that
Law & Economics provides theories about human behavior and cost-benefit
analysis, it becomes apparent why this movement has had so much impact on the
law. But Law & Economics thinking probably fits best in courses where efficiency
and distributional consequences are not too far below the surface of the black
letter material. In this regard, courses in torts, compensation systems, contracts,
property, and public policymaking will lend themselves quite readily to this
material. It will also be useful in procedural courses regardless of whether the
procedure is civil, criminal, or administrative. Again, we think this is "must"
knowledge for students of the law.
Chapter Three, PoliticalPhilosophyand Law, has a wide application as well but
perhaps fits most comfortably with "public" law courses (although we do not want
to make too much of the public-private distinction). For example, this material can
be readily employed in government law classes such as administrative law and
can be of particular use in constitutional law and statutory interpretation courses.
Chapter Four,AmericanGovernment Structure:Its Impact on Law, similarly has
ready application to constitutional law and government law courses. It also is
particularly apt for civil procedure courses, where students often do not see the
frequent link between a society's system of government and its system of
litigation.
Chapter Five, Law, Dispute Resolution, and the Adversary System, is valuable
in litigation-related courses for the same reason as above since it expressly
discusses the adversary system, a topic that usually gets too little textual
attention in most courses. Courses in civil procedure, criminal procedure, evidence,
complex litigation and the like will perhaps be most apt for this chapter.
Chapter Six, Historical,Jurisprudential,and MultidisciplinaryInfluences on
Law, can serve as an introduction or synopsis for even full-fledged jurisprudence,
legal history, or legal theory courses. It is intended in the main, however, to be
background reading across the modern law curriculum since so many legal
outcomes depend upon the jurisprudential orientation of the legal decisionmaker.
Id. at 8-9.
197.

DAVID CRUMP, How To REASON ABOUT THE LAw: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

To THE FOuNDAIONS OF PU3LIC POLiCY (2001). The book contains sections (which contain
individual chapters) on logic and fallacy in the law; economics, finance, and markets
(including management); ethical and political reasoning; science and the social sciences
(science, jurisprudence, and psychology); probabilities and statistics in legal reasoning;
game theory and strategy (including rhetoric). Id. However, it does not address the
adversary system. See id.
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The sources range from Plato to Pareto, from Kant to Clausewitz,
from Rawls to Rousseau, from Freud to Friedman, and from Adam and
Eve to Adam Smith. ... [Ylou will apply .. . these ideas to interdisciplinary issues of law and justice....
[Tihe purpose of this book is to cover methods of thinking, like
Clausewitz's study of military strategy, that are useful in legal
reasoning but get left out of a lot of peoples' educations. And besides
Clausewitz, you will meet many more interesting characters in these
pages. Did you know, for example, that there is a form of deductive
logic named Barbara? ...
You also will encounter the ontological proof of the existence of God,
the Keynsian multiplier, the Coase Theorem, the trolley problem, and
Arrow's Theorem of Public Choice, and you will apply each one of these
ideas to issues of law and justice....
All of these concepts are thinking tools. They can help you to analyze
the arguments that other people make, as well as to develop your own.
They can guide your thinking about issues of public policy, and they
can sharpen your personal decisions. And every one of them will help
you become a more competent student of the law...
I included a big dose of economics.... The subject is vital for
understanding public policy, and it is also important in personal
decisions....
I've also included some selected scientific principles.... [L]awyers
frequently must contend with scientific issues, in lawsuits, in regulatory or legislative matters, and in real estate contracts, and it will be
a serious disadvantage for your clients if your eyes glaze over anytime
these issues arise.
There's also coverage of ethical philosophy,.. . psychology, political
theory, probabilities, statistics, regression analysis, accounting, finance
and management....
[F]ew people, even if well educated, have mastered all the subjects
in this book. Even fewer have applied them all to the law ....
[Elvery time, this interdisciplinary approach will be tied to legal
questions. The purpose is to make you a more complete lawyer.'
The subheadings for each chapter are additionally suggestive of the
value of such perspectives in the practice of law.'

198. Id. at xxiii-xxvii.
199. The subheadings include: Logic (Syllogisms, Deduction, Induction, and Logical

Propositions in the Law: From the IRAC Method to the Commerce Power); Fallacy (False
Reasoning, Inquiry, and the Limits of Logic); Economics I (Prices, Markets, Economic
Efficiency, and the Law); Economics II (Redressing Market Imperfections: Structure,
Externalities, and Transaction Costs); Finance (Risk, Return, and Valuation; Accounting
and the Law); Management (Organization, Decision-making, and Marketing Theory for
Lawyers); Ethics (Teleology, Deontology, and Distributive and Procedural Justice); Politics
(Democratic Institutions, Tradeoffs, and Public Choice); Science (Scientific Method and the
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In short, as Kuklin, Stempel, and Crump rightly recognize, exposure
to perspectives subject matter gives our students knowledge of important
"sources of law" and skill in handling them, thereby enabling students
to understand these sources and to make persuasive arguments."oo As
my colleague Jack Sammons and others emphasize, the work of the
lawyer is that of the rhetorician who must seek, within the materials of
the law, the arguments that most effectively further his or her client's
interests to the particular audience to which the arguments are
addressed.2 01 We do a serious disservice to our students, their future
clients, the legal profession they will be joining, and the society of which
we are all a part, if we fail to enable our students to develop the full
range of arguments that may prove effective. Only by exposing them to
perspectives subject matter do we endow our students with the capacity
to argue with such breadth.

2. Character-Qualitiesof Character,Lawyer Professionalism,and
Sense of Calling
Perspectives subject matter and courses also contribute to the
formation of the good lawyer's character and sense of calling. Although
this contribution may be less immediately obvious than their contribution to the development of technical expertise, it is no less important.202

Law; History and the Social Sciences); Jurisprudence (Legal Theory, Rules, and
Interpretation); Psychology (Psychological Disorders, Learning Theory, Intelligence, and
Social Psychology); Probabilities (Probabilistic Reasoning in the Law, Bayes' Theorem, and
the Interval Distribution); Statistics (Sampling, Interpretation, Statistical Significance, and
Regression Analysis in the Law); Game Theory I (Zero-Sum Games, Competitive Tactics,
and the Law); Game Theory II (Cooperative Moves, Mixed-Motive Games, and Legal
Strategies); Rhetoric (Strategies for Questioning, Listening, Persuasion, and Negotiation).
Id. at v-xxii (Table of Contents).
200. Both books illustrate the value of such perspectives for a greater understanding
of legal doctrine and for the skills involved in influencing decision-making in the context
of judicial adjudication and legislative law reform. See supra notes 149-59, 173-79 and
accompanying text; see also supra notes 180-83 (decision-making involved in applying or
reforming other public or quasi-public normative orderings). However, the considerably
greater range of subject matter in Crump's book and the author's treatment of this subject
matter illustrate the value of such perspectives for influencing decision-making in other
contexts also, such as counseling clients and representing them in negotiations, and for
development and use of the skills involved. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Jack L. Sammons, The RadicalEthics ofLegal Rhetoricians, 32 VAL.
U. L. REV. 93 (1997); Jack L. Sammons, "Cheaterl"The CentralMoral Admonition of Legal
Ethics, Games, Lusory Attitudes, Internal Perspectives,and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 273
(2002) [hereinafter Sammons, "Cheater!".
202. One should remember, too, that in practice a lawyer's character and technical
expertise are necessarily interdependent. See supra text accompanying note 142.
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The contribution of perspectives subject matter and courses to the
formation of character and sense of calling may entail one or both of the
forms of comparison identified in the discussion of technical expertise
above."o3 It also entails a comparison of one's actual self with one's
potential selves and/or with others. This latter form of comparison may
be explicit and conscious, or it may be implicit and unconscious as the
relevant perspectives experience works upon the soul of the student in
subtle and unnoticed ways.

a. General Qualitiesof Character
As discussed earlier, the good and practically wise lawyer must be able
to empathize and, at the same time, retain a sufficient degree of
detachment to ensure independence of judgment.2 1"Moreover, development of this bifocal capacity, which Anthony Kronman calls "sympathetic
detachment,"o5 requires the training of perception, emotion, and moral
imagination through the acquisition-personally or derivatively through
others' accounts-of relevant experience.206 Perspectives subject matter
and perspectives courses can have a very important role to play in
developing this critically important character trait.20 7 Perspectives
subject matter and courses, such as legal history, jurisprudence, and
comparative law, typically encourage an exploration of diverse worldviews, ideologies, and cultural narratives. The same may also be true of
international law and even courses such as law and economics. To

203. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
204. See supranotes 63-67 and accompanying text; see also MACCRATE REPORT, supra
note 12, at 173-75 (Skill 5: Communication, especially Skill 5.1, Skill 5.2 (a) (ii), and Skill
5. 2(c), emphasizing the importance of understanding the perspective of others in both
sending and receiving communications), 177-81 (Skill 6: Counseling, especially Skill 6.1(b),
Skill 6.2 (c), 6.4 (a), and 6.4 (d)(iii), emphasizing the need to see matters from the client's
perspective while maintaining the necessary "dispassion and objectivity" in order to provide
effective counseling), 187-89 (Skill 7: Negotiation, especially Skill 7.1 (f)(i), and Skill 7.2 (a)
and (b), emphasizing the need to understand the perspective of the other party and the
other party's counsel in order to negotiate effectively), 218 (Value 4: Professional SelfDevelopment, especially Value 4.1 (aXi)(IV), stressing the importance of evaluating "[tlhe
accuracy of one's assessments of the likely perspectives, concerns, and reactions of any
individuals with whom one interacted (such as, for example, clients, other lawyers, judges,
mediators, legislators, and government officials)" in order to learn from experience in
seeking to increase one's knowledge and skills).
205. KRONMAN, supra note 45. For a discussion of the bifocal character of this
disposition, see id. at 72-73.
206. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
207. Other types of curricular experiences may also contribute to the development of
this capacity. As mentioned supra text accompanying note 50, Kronman shows how this
includes the case method of teaching itself, at least when done well.
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encourage such an exploration, perspectives courses must challenge
students to transcend their own "situatedness" and to "see the world"
through the eyes of those who are different, sometimes extremely
different. However wrong or even nonsensical the views or actions of
other human beings may seem, the challenge is to try to understand why
such views or actions nevertheless seem right and "make sense" to those
who hold or take them. However, the process of "cultural immersion"
involved in trying to achieve such sympathetic understanding only calls
for suspension or postponement, and not an abdication, of judgment. It
therefore requires that a certain degree of detachment be maintained as
well. 208
Further development of the capacity for sympathetic detachment
through the study of perspectives subject matter and courses is
especially valuable in contemporary circumstances. Such subject matter
and courses typically expose students to a great range of "diversity."
This "diversity" includes the more familiar kinds such as race, gender,
and sexual orientation, but it extends far beyond them to the point
where, in the words of the Roman playwright Terence, "nothing human
is foreign to me."209 The "moral cosmopolitanism" 10 that is central
to such humanism does not necessarily preclude the need to make
judgments, but it does help to ensure that such judgments are wise ones
because they are informed by an understanding of the complexity of
humanity and human experience. 21 ' This is not only helpful but

208. For a useful summary of the methodology of "cultural immersion" in comparative
law (and more generally), see VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW 120-23
(2002). See also KRONMAN, supra note 45, at 69-72 (comparing sympathetic detachment
with the efforts of historians and anthropologists to "make sense of the experience of other
people" who are "remote from them in time and cultural attitude").
209. KRONMAN, supra note 45, at 159 (quoting the "old Roman motto" from Terence);
see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, EDUCATION'S END: WHY OUR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
HAVE GIVEN UP ON THE MEANING OF LIFE 153-59 (2007) [hereinafter KRONMAN,
EDUCATION's END] (comparing the "deeper and more challenging" kind of diversity, a "real
and disturbing diversity," celebrated by the ideal of secular humanism, with more limited
and shallower kind of diversity promoted by the values ofpolitical liberalism and concerned
with matters of race, gender, and ethnicity). Kronman is emphatically not opposed to
promoting liberal diversity in the political community or in higher education; he is opposed,
however, to allowing an overriding concern with such diversity to constrain exploration of
deeper questions of meaning. Id. at 154-55.
210. KRONMAN, supra note 45, at 159.
211.

I would argue that it also contributes to development of the "skill of creativity"

that the MacCrate Report identifies as "crucial for the effective application of virtually all
the skills analyzed in the Statement" and that this is also a vital part of the "sound
judgment" that the MacCrate Report identifies as another such crucial and generally
applicable attribute. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 150; see also supra note 186
(discussing the "skill of creativity" in the context of Skill 1: Problem Solving).
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essential to any vision of good lawyering in a society as pluralistic as
U.S. society today.212 Moreover, this pluralism is magnified when one's
legal practice acquires any kind of transnational dimension, which is
increasingly likely in our era of globalization.213

b. Lawyer Professionalism
Perspectives subject matter and courses directly contribute to further
development of the qualities of character identified by the ABA
Professionalism Committee2 14 and the values identified by the MacCrate Report.215

212. Cf. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 213-14 (Value 2: Striving to Promote
Justice, Fairness, and Morality, which also includes "[tireating other people (including
clients, other attorneys, and support personnel) with dignity and respect," including
"refraining from sexual harassment and from any form of discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, age, or disability"), 216-17 (Value
3: Striving to Improve the Profession, which includes "striv[ing] to rid the profession of the
existence and effects of bias based on race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, sexual
orientation, age, or disability").
213. See KRONMAN, EDUCATION's END, supranote 209, at 165-66 n.22 (emphasizing the
value of multicultural understanding in today's world and citing, and quoting, MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM,

CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM IN HIGHER

EDUCATION 50-84, 63 (1997) ("The task of world citizenship requires the would-be world
citizen to become a sensitive and empathetic interpreter. Education at all ages should
cultivate the capacity for such interpreting.")).
214. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Beyond these, one of the specific
Skills identified by the MacCrate Report is also highly relevant in this context. See
MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 203-07 (Skill 10: Recognizing and Resolving Ethical
Dilemmas). For further discussion of this Skill, see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See also supra text accompanying note 155 (discussing the relevance, for Skill 2: Legal
Analysis and Reasoning, of Value 2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality),
note 157 (discussing the relevance, for Skill 4: Factual Investigation, of Value 1: Provision
of Competent Representation and Value 4: Professional Self-Development), note 176
(discussing the relevance, for Skill 3: Legal Research related to law reform efforts, of Value
2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality), note 189 (discussing the relevance,
for Skill 6: Counseling, of Value 2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality),
and MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 213-14 (Commentary to Value 2: Striving to
Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality, identifying those "qualities" that have constituted
the lawyer's "moral character" throughout the centuries, including "those qualities of truthspeaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, [and] of the strictest observance
of fiduciary responsibility").
Perspectives subject matter and courses also contribute indirectly to these qualities of
character in that the capacity for sympathetic detachment-for empathy and for
independence of judgment-is itself central to the proper structuring of relationships with
both the client and others that is at the heart of these qualities; and, as discussed supra
notes 204-13 and accompanying text, perspectives subject matter and perspectives courses
have an important role in shaping and strengthening this capacity further.
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Attributes such as ethical conduct and integrity, dedication to justice
and the public good, and the capacity for self-scrutiny and for moral
dialogue with clients and other individuals involved in the justice system
all require in differing modes and combinations the classical virtues of
courage, temperance, and justice, as well as the ability to engage in good
moral reasoning with oneself and others-so, of course, do attributes such
as maintenance of competence, thoroughness of preparation, subordination of personal interests and viewpoints to interests of clients and the
public good, appropriate deportment and civility, and economic
temperance. These virtues and moral reasoning abilities, in turn, all
have their part to play in exercising the master virtue of practical
wisdom in any given set of circumstances. And they can all be further
shaped and strengthened by perspectives subject matter and perspectives courses.
Who can fail to be touched, inspired, even transformed, by reading the
various powerful accounts of justice that have been offered throughout
the ages,21 or the narratives of injustice and the struggles for justice
that have marked human history, or philosophical accounts of moral
reasoning or the great virtues?"' Such matters can only be properly
appreciated when they are understood in their particular historical,
intellectual, and cultural contexts. And who can then fail to be touched,
inspired, even transformed, by studying the roots of the modern West
and Western law in the civilizations and moral and legal orders of the
ancient world and of medieval Europe, or the history and the moral and
legal orders of non-Western cultures, or the remarkable moral achievements of the modern West and Western law themselves, or the efforts
of international society and the international legal order to promote
peace, justice, and prosperity? Ifthe gods smile upon us, such experiences and perspectives may also help to combat our human tendency
towards hubris by promoting the additional virtue of proper humility.218

216. Whether the fiery passion of the Hebrew Prophets or the cooler rationality of
Rawls.
217. Or by depictions of historical figures who instantiated these virtues-Socrates, for
example, or Jesus or Muhammad or Cicero or Thomas More (the patron saint of lawyers)
or Abraham Lincoln (arguably the patron saint of American lawyers) or Ghandi (arguably
the patron saint of Third World lawyers) or Martin Luther King?
218. Cf. supra note 68 and accompanying text. We may be moved to such humility by
the realization that, for all the achievements of the modern West, including the material
improvements wrought by the marvels of modern science and technology, we are indeed
"dwarves perched on the shoulders of giants"; by dissolution of the simplistic caricatures
under which we usually labor in our encounters with non-Western cultures (Islamic
civilization or Chinese civilization or indigenous peoples, for example) and by recognition
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c. Sense of Calling, Purpose, and Professional Identity
Perspectives subject matter and courses directly contribute to
cultivation of the sense of professional calling, purpose, and professional
identity.219 The type of touching, inspiration, or transformation
described above situates the student within larger structures or
narratives of meaning and purpose. 220 As a result, the student is better
situated to discover the meaning of both terms in Frederick Buechner's
definition of vocation as "the place where your deep gladness and the
world's deep hunger meet.n221 The quest to discover that deep gladness
and that deep need is, of course, a profoundly personal one. In this way,
we can also think of perspectives subject matter and courses as exploring
the vital "interrogative of professional identity" that asks where I am as
part of the larger human story of law and lawyering (historically,
philosophically, ideologically, comparatively, etc.), and the exploration of
that question helps us to answer the other interrogatives of identity.22 2
Once I have a better understanding of where I am in this larger sense,
I am literally better situated to discover why I am in law school, what
I want in life, and who I am. The larger "where" question is central to
the overall quest for meaning and identity.
Finding meaning in one's work is crucial to doing it well, and doing
work well is crucial for living a life well lived. By helping students to see
the law and lawyering in context, perspectives subject matter and
courses enable them to forge a connection to the animating purposes and
accomplishments of the law and the legal profession. They are then able
to see themselves as serving those larger animating purposes and

of the wisdom they carry; by awareness of the distinctiveness, fragility, and preciousness
of our own moral achievements in the West; and by appreciation of the limits as well as
the promise of international law in controlling the worse angels of our nature. The
expression "dwarves perched on the shoulders of giants" was first attributed to Bernard
of Chartres by John of Salisbury in the twelfth century. See THE METALOGICON OF JOHN
OF SALISBURY 167 (1955).
219. Perspectives subject matter and courses also contribute indirectly to cultivation
of the sense of calling insofar as they help to develop the various attributes of the good and
practically wise lawyer in all the ways already discussed and insofar as becoming a good
and practically wise lawyer is its own calling.
220. Cf. KRONMAN, EDUCATION'S END, supra note 209, at 76-87 (discussing three
assumptions underlying the educational philosophy of secular humanism and emphasizing
the need for human beings to locate themselves within larger and more lasting "structures
of value," such as those explored in the "great conversation" that is the focus of the
tradition of arts and letters, "as a condition of their living purposeful lives").
221. FREDERICK BUECHNER, WISHFUL THINKING: A SEEKER's ABC 119 (1993).
222. For discussion of various issues and questions related to professional identity, see
Floyd, supra note 58.
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accomplishments-to "find" their "selves" in those purposes and accomplishments-and to be motivated by this vision in their work. 22 We do
a serious disservice to our students, the clients they will be serving, the
legal profession they will be joining, and the society of which we are all
a part, if we fail to reinforce these larger, more ennobling visions in
every way possible. 2"

223. Such ability helps them avoid an alternative vision-a corrupting, diminishing
vision-in which they see themselves as mere instruments seeking to unleash the coercive
force of the state in service to the selfish interests of money or power, whether those selfish
interests be those of their clients, their own, or both. One must be careful here, of course.
There is risk of "corruption" even if the lawyer seeks to attain the "higher" type of external
goods (as opposed to "lower" external goods such as money or power) but does so without
regard to whether such goods may have been appropriately refracted or inflected or
modulated into a profession-specific form within the practice and thus may have become
internal goods of the practice itself. This is because in such circumstances even the "higher"
type of motivation may tempt the lawyer to "cheat" and thus have the undesirable result
of effectively disabling the lawyer from attaining the internal goods of the practice,
including acquiring the practical wisdom of the practice and/or exercising such practical
wisdom in any given case or in general depending on the extent, duration, and intensity
of such motivation. Moreover, to the extent the lawyer views the profession as a mere
instrument for achieving such external goods, however worthy, the lawyer is arguably
called to those external goods and not to the profession itself. This not only suggests that
having the appropriate vocational disposition or sense of calling is one of the necessary
qualities of character required by the good lawyer as part of the ensemble of professional
attributes. It also suggests the need for practical wisdom in the process of vocational
discernment itself. I am indebted to my colleague Jack Sammons for bringing this point
to my attention. For an excellent and illuminating discussion of the notion of "cheating" as
applied to legal practice, see Sammons, "Cheater",supra note 201.
Perhaps of some relevance in this context too is the MacCrate Report's admonition that
a lawyer should remain "constantly alert to the existence of problems that may impede or
impair the lawyer's ability to provide competent representation (such as alcohol abuse,
drug abuse, psychological or emotional problems, senility, or other types of health
problems)." MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 209, 12 (Value 1.2 (dXi) and Commentary).
224. All this finds ample and authoritative confirmation in the long-standing tradition
of recommended lists of supplementary reading intended to produce liberally-educated
lawyers going back to the days of Justice Story at Harvard Law School in the early
nineteenth century. For further discussion of the Harvard Law School curricular model and
the supplementation of the curriculum by such recommended reading lists under Justice
Story and his successors during the first phase, see Jones, HistoricalFramework Phase I,
supra note 2, at 1085-87. For a relatively recent and remarkable example of the genre, see
JuLIus J. MARKE & EDWARD J. BANDER, DEANs' LIsT OF RECOMMENDED READING FOR
PRELAW AND LAW STUDENTS: SELECTED BY THE DEANS AND FACULTIES OF AMERICAN LAW

SCHOOLS (2d ed. 1984). Significantly, the authors of the prefatory and introductory
comments claim that this annotated list contains "all the hallowed names of men and
women who have contributed to law as known in our Western civilization," including "a
galaxy of names connected with other disciplines," and represents "a vital compilation of
books with which people involved in the legal profession should be familiar."Id. at xiii, xv.
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B. EnsuringA Serious and Sustained Perspectives Exposure in the
Curriculum
The ABA Professionalism Committee, the Carnegie Foundation Report
on Educating Lawyers, and the Study on Best Practices for Legal
Education all recognize the value of perspectives subject matter and
courses and the need to ensure that students receive a serious and
sustained perspectives exposure during their legal education. They also
all acknowledge that law schools should ensure that students receive the
necessary experiences through a strategy that combines exposure in
special dedicated courses with incorporation of relevant exposure into
other courses.
1. The Need to Ensure A Serious and Sustained Perspectives
Exposure
In its recent studies and reports on professional education, the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching has employed a
framework recognizing what it calls 'The Three Apprenticeships of
Professional Education": the intellectual or cognitive apprenticeship
(focused on "the knowledge and way of thinking of the profession"); the
practice-based apprenticeship (focused on "the forms of expert practice
shared by competent practitioners"); and the ethical-social apprenticeship or apprenticeship of identity and purpose (focused on "the purposes
and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the professional
community is responsible").2 25 The Carnegie Report on Educating
Lawyers finds an imbalance in standard legal education resulting from
an excessive emphasis upon the cognitive or intellectual apprenticeship
and calls for an integrative rebalancing that would give appropriate
weight to all three apprenticeships.22 6
Three aspects of the Carnegie Report are especially relevant to the
present discussion of perspectives subject matter and courses. First, the
report recognizes that the third apprenticeship "also shares aspects of
liberal education in attempting to provide a wide, ethically sensitive
perspective on the technical knowledge and skill that the practice of law
Second, the report discovers a "curricular emphasis on
requires.""

They suggest, too, that the list will assist faculty "to train students in the grand manner,"
and express their belief "that as [readers] peruse the ideas and ideals of our antecedents
they will understand why the law is a great calling, and that those who decide to pursue
a career in the law will hear the call." Id.
225. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 15, at 27-29.
226. See generally id.

227. Id. at 28.
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analysis and technical competence at the expense of human connection,
social context, and social consequences [that] is reinforced by the broader
culture in most law schools," and it finds that "a concentrated focus on
the details of particular legal cases, disconnected from consideration of
the larger purposes of the law," begins in the first year when "students
are told repeatedly to focus on the procedural and formal aspects of legal
reasoning, its 'hard' edge, with the 'soft' sides of law, especially moral
concerns or compassion for clients and concerns for substantive justice,
either tacitly or explicitly pushed to the sidelines. 228 Third, the report
maintains that "[a] more integrated drawing together of the three
apprenticeships could enable students to place their learning of legal
reasoning ... within a fuller understanding of law as a moral and social
institution," and it recommends "an integrative strategy [that] . . .
would, from the outset, link the learning of legal reasoning more directly
with consideration of the historical, social, and philosophical dimensions
of law and the legal profession, including some cross-national comparison
. . . . "229 The report observes that "[s]uch a rich intellectual matrix
would provide a concrete context within which students could pursue a
fuller 'theorizing of legal practice,' including their own future roles and
responsibilities."230
Very clearly, then, the Carnegie Report contends that law schools
should pay more attention to perspectives subject matter addressing the
social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law and lawyering.
Moreover, the report underlines that law schools should do so "from the
outset."231
Like the Carnegie Foundation Report, the Study on Best Practices also
emphasizes "the value of broad-based legal education,"232 stating that
"[tlhe preparation of students for practice involves much more than
simply training students to perform mechanical lawyering tasks."13
The study quotes with approval the following reflections by Alan Watson
in response to suggestions from his students that "the sole, or virtually
sole, purpose of a law school should be to provide training for the
practice of law":
There is so much more to the law, even for the practice of law, than
that: issues such as the social functions of law, the factors that
influence legal development, patterns of change, the interaction of law

228. Id. at 139, 141.
229. Id. at 194.
230. Id.

231.

Supra note 229 and accompanying text

232.

STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 18.

233. Id. at 17.
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with other forms of social control such as religion, and, of course, the
relationship of law and ethics. Law students should be trained to have
a greater awareness of their role in society. Law school is the obvious
place and time for presenting the greater dimension of law. Law
teachers should cater to the needs of the lawyer philosopher as well as
the lawyer plumber. Both types of lawyer are necessary for a healthy
societyZU
More specifically, the authors maintain that first-year students
should be introduced to jurisprudence, the history and values of the
legal profession and professions in general, notable figures in the law,
the role of lawyers, the ways in which legal problems arise and are
resolved in our society and other societies, and challenges facing the
legal profession such as commercialization, accountability, and access
to justice.=
The Study on Best Practices similarly endorses the integrative and
pervasive approach towards legal education.2 6

2. Strategies for Ensuring a Serious and Sustained Perspectives
Exposure and the Need for a Perspectives Course Requirement
One strategy for providing integrated perspectives exposure that is
adequate and effective 237 is to incorporate perspectives exposure to the
social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law into law school

234. Id. (quoting Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 91, 93 (2001)); see also id. at 50-55 (describing various statements of
"desirable outcomes" of legal education, that is, "the core general characteristics and
abilities that we might want new lawyers to possess"). As observed supra text accompanying note 59, two of these statements (by Lasso and Mudd) explicitly, and several others
implicitly, include "perspective" as a desirable outcome. Id.
235. STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 276.
236. Id. at 97-104. As far as the ABA Professionalism Committee is concerned, it is
clear from its specific recommendations to law schools for teaching ethics and professionalism by the pervasive method, discussed infra note 244, that the Committee also recognizes
the value of perspectives subject matter and courses, the need to ensure that students
receive a serious and sustained perspectives exposure during their legal education, and the
desirability of providing this exposure through an integrative and pervasive approach.
237. The extent to which a law school curriculum provides adequate and effective
perspectives exposure depends upon several factors. In the first instance, of course, it
depends upon the extent to which the exposure actually occurs. For a theoretical
framework that identifies and analyzes three factors relevant to determining the extent to
which a law school curriculum actually exposes students to a particular set of fundamental
dimensions of law, as well as four factors relevant to determining whether the actual
exposure is effective (or, as presently formulated, adequate and effective), see Jones,
Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 622-29; Jones, HistoricalFramework Phase I,
supra note 2, at 1172-74. The present discussion will draw upon this theoretical framework.

2012]

LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION

1043

courses with a primary emphasis upon other fundamental dimensions.
For example, material on economic analysis or relevant international
treaties or foreign law might be incorporated into a course on contracts
or torts, or material on moral responsibility or neuroscience might be
incorporated into a course on criminal law." This strategy for exposing students to the richness and diversity of the law and lawyering, and
thereby helping them develop key aspects of "practical wisdom" and
"thinking like a good lawyer," offers the distinct and commendable
advantage of enabling students to understand how such perspectives
subject matter applies in concrete, practical contexts.m
The incorporation strategy presents two problems, however. First,
because there is never enough time in a course to cover all the possible
topics, faculty must ration the limited time available. Because of the
persistent neo-Langdellian prejudice discussed earlier,"o when we
have to make choices about coverage, we invariably sacrifice the
historical or international or comparative or jurisprudential or ethical or
other perspectives material in favor of the "essential" legal material that
we "must" cover. Because the prejudice tells us that the perspectives
material is not "the real thing" but really just "enrichment," we will
either not assign it at all or optimistically assign it as independent
reading that may or, more likely, may not be tested on the examination.
Even assuming that students do such independent reading, their
exposure is likely inadequate and considerably reduced in effectiveness
because the material is not addressed in class.
Second, even assuming faculty cover perspectives material when it is
incorporated in their courses, are we not unwittingly offering students
bits and pieces of perspectives subject matter that, wrenched out of their
disciplinary context, defy proper appreciation and comprehension?"

238. As further examples, material on political theory might be incorporated into
constitutional law, or material on relevant English legal history might be incorporated into
a course on property law.
239. See Jones, Theoretical Framework, supra note 2, at 629 (noting "the important
issue . . . of how well the various mental structures pertaining to different sets (and
subsets) of fundamental dimensions of law are integrated with each other and the extent,
therefore, to which mental structures are 'multicontextual,' enabling their owners to deal
effectively and efficiently with the total context of a given legal situation").
240. See supra notes 18, 40 and accompanying text.
241. At the risk of appearing whimsical, one can envisage something like a little bit of
Aristotle here, and a little bit of Plato (or perhaps a little bit of Kant) there, potted or
original (probably potted), or a little bit of American legal history here and a little bit of
Civil Law (or, if we are really daring, a little bit of Islamic Law) there (perhaps also
throwing in a little bit of international law for good measure), or a little bit of economics
here (Coase is always good) and a little bit of sociology or cognitive psychology there. The
metaphor of Humpty Dumpty comes to mind, especially if one sees him as not just falling
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In short, exposure provided through the incorporation strategy is likely
to be partial, nonsystematic, and fragmented.242
The obvious solution to the second problem presented by the incorporation strategy is to complement that strategy with serious and sustained
perspectives exposure in specifically dedicated courses. In short, mount
freestanding courses with a primary focus upon the social, cultural, and
various transnational dimensions of law. Through such a dedicated
courses strategy, the curriculum can provide perspectives exposure that
is (a) systematic and integrative with regard to the particular perspective(s) addressed and (b) increasingly comprehensive as the range and
diversity of the perspectives included in the coverage increases. 2 43 By
combining the two strategies, the curriculum can provide perspectives
exposure that is highly contextual along both horizontal and vertical
axes. And to ensure that students receive the dedicated perspectives
exposure needed to complement the incorporated one, that exposure
must be required.
Adopting a combined strategy for providing appropriate perspectives
exposure is hardly a novel idea. Such a strategy is common in the areas
of skills training, ethics, and professionalism. And it is a strategy that
is endorsed and recommended by the ABA Professionalism Committee
Report,2 the Carnegie Foundation Report, " and the Study on Best

but as being pushed-by post-Enlightenment analytical, mechanical, and reductionist
thinking (with Langdell cheering and pushing hard as well).
242. It may appear that in pointing out these two problems, I am making unwarranted
assertions. Ideally, one would like to have adequate empirical data, generated by
appropriate surveys, regarding these matters. However, I do have some basis for making
these claims. Thus, I am just as guilty as anyone of treating the perspectives material in
some of my courses as being of secondary importance. For the past four years, I have not
covered the morality and policy chapter included in the Immigration Law casebook I use
because "the law" (the statutory, regulatory, and other administrative material) governing
the areas we need to cover has grown so much in recent years and I am too pressed for
time. Instead, I have assigned this material as independent reading that the students must
complete before the end of the course. I do still cover the historical material in class.
However, I do not directly test the students' knowledge of any of this material on the exam
(time and coverage again). And in those years when I have covered the morality and policy
material in class, I have been comfortable addressing the former but have felt out of my
depth with some of the latter (especially the economics material). So, I claim no special
virtue and, for some types of material, I claim no special expertise. Perhaps I am alone in
this, but I suspect not.
243. Of course, a dedicated courses strategy is even more necessary to the extent the
first problem faced by the incorporation strategy is present as well.
244. See PROFESSIONALiSM COMMYTTEE REPORT, supranote 13, at 21 (footnotes omitted)
(including among the Committee's recommendations to law schools for teaching legal ethics
and professionalism by the pervasive method "[tihe development of additional perspective
courses and seminars that focus on multiculturalism and diversity, the internationalization
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Practices.2 6 But why must a dedicated perspectives exposure be
required? Perspectives courses addressing the social, cultural, and
transnational dimensions of law have proliferated in recent decades.
Given that law school curricula typically include many dedicated

and globalization of law and law practice, jurisprudence, legal history, and professionalism
issues such as the strengths and weaknesses of our justice system. . . ."); id. at 20 & n.50
(including among those same recommendations "a course, or alternatively a lecture series,
introducing first-year law students to important ethical and professionalism issues" and
listing the Kuklin and Stempel book, discussed supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text,
as one of the possible suitable texts that could be used); see also id. at 15 (discussing, with
approval, Notre Dame's "perspective course requirement, which can be met by a number
of different courses"). For the Professionalism Committee's understanding of the "pervasive
method" in teaching ethics and professionalism, see supra text accompanying note 123.
245. See SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 15, at 196-97 ("We believe
that the demands of an integrative approach require both attention to how fully issues of
the ethical-social apprenticeship 'pervade' the doctrinal and lawyering curricula and the
provision of educational experiences directly concerned with the values and situation of the
law and the legal profession."); see also id. at 153 (discussing with approval various U.S.
and Canadian "first-year courses or programs that provide a broad intellectual perspective
on the law," and singling out the required semester and a half Perspectives on Law course
at the University of British Columbia, which "consists of three six-week segments or
modules, each taught by a different instructor," with students choosing among "topics like
comparative law, environmental ethics and law, feminist perspectives on law, First Nation
perspectives, obedience to law, and law and economics").
246. See STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES, supranote 16, at 286 (emphasizing the need
for law schools to exercise leadership, and characterizing the curricular changes adopted
by Harvard Law School in 2006 under the leadership of then-Dean Elena Kagan, including
the addition of three new required courses in the first year with consequent reduction in
the hours allocated to five traditional doctrinal first-year courses, as well as redesign of the
second and third years, as "steps in the right direction" suggesting that "Harvard Law
School [may] lead the way out of the quagmire that it inadvertently led legal education into
130 years ago"). The Best Practices Study cites an article in the publication Harvard Law
Today explaining that the curricular changes seek to ensure inter alia "[slystematic
attention to international and comparative law and economic systems" and "[mi]ore
sustained opportunities to reflect on the entire enterprise of law and legal studies, the
assumptions and methods of contemporary U.S. law, and the perspectives provided by
other systems and disciplines." Rethinking Langdell: Historic Changes in 1L Curriculum
Set Stage for New Upper-Level Programs of Study, HARv. L. TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 5,
availableat http:/Avww.law.harvard.edu/news/today/de.hltlangdell.pdf More specifically,
in addition to a course focusing on legislation and regulation, first-year students are also
required to take "one of three specialty crafted courses introducing global legal systems and
concerns [and] a course focusing on problem solving, which also will introduce students to
theoretical frameworks illuminating legal doctrines and institutions." Id. The article
further explains that these changes complement curricular reforms in the second and third
years "which promote more focused, interdisciplinary programs of study in the following
categories: Law and Government; Law and Business; Law, Science and Technology; Law
and the International Sphere; and Law and Social Change." Id.
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perspectives coursesm'7 wouldn't students take such a course anyway?
In fact, the experience at various law schools without a dedicated
perspectives course requirement is not especially encouraging. It appears
that because of our old friend, the neo-Langdellian prejudice, a great
deal turns on whether these courses are required, strongly recommended, or "mere electives."'
Under the influence of the neo-Langdellian prejudice, most students
will likely elect not to take any dedicated perspectives courses that are
"mere electives"-that is, courses that are not regarded as being of such
fundamental value and importance that they should be required or at
least strongly recommended. Although more students are likely to take
such courses if there is a collective institutional "strong recommendation" that they do so, a significant proportion of students may still decide
not to follow that recommendation. Because of the neo-Langdellian
prejudice, students will gravitate towards courses, and some faculty may
steer them towards courses, that address "real law."" Such behavior
reflects a failure to recognize the practical and professional value of
perspectives subject matter and courses or a mistaken belief that
whatever practical and professional value perspectives subject matter
may have is realized by a broad mandate to faculty to incorporate some
such subject matter in their courses, or both.so

247. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Jennifer Cihon, New Course Offerings in the
Upper-Level Curriculum: Report of an AALS Survey, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524 (1997)
(analyzing new upper-class courses and seminars added to U.S. law school curricula in
1994-97); Am. Bar Ass'n, A Survey of Law School Curricula1992-2002 (2004) (analyzing
U.S. law school curricular developments and trends between 1992 and 2002).
248. It is very important not to be misled by appearances, and especially not by the
number of dedicated perspectives courses in the curriculum. The degree to which a law
school curriculum actually exposes students to perspectives subject matter in such
dedicated courses depends not only upon the number of courses in the curriculum but also
upon the percentageof students who take such courses and how many of them they take
(that is, the percentage of students who take one such course, two such courses, three such
courses, and so on).
249. Students and faculty may favor a particular perspectives course, however, if it
seems to serve a student's chosen specialized career path (however temporary that choice
may prove to be after graduation).
250. Once again, it may appear that I am making unwarranted assertions in the text,
and once again it would be helpful to have adequate empirical data, generated by
appropriate surveys, regarding these matters. However, once again, too, I do have some
basis for making these claims. Thus, as part of a survey of law school registrars on their
listserve, discussed infra note 253, 1 also sought an estimate of the percentage of students
who took a perspectives course, as understood in this Article, at those schools without a
perspectives requirement. Although I received only three replies supplying such information, and the sample is therefore too small to justify any definite conclusions, the
answers-ranging from "about 10%" through "less than 50%" to "about 85%"-are
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The only way, then, to ensure that law students receive the necessary
perspectives exposure in dedicated courses is to impose a curricular
requirement. Only in this way is it possible to combat the persistent
influence of the neo-Langdellian prejudice effectively.251 Doubtless this
helps to explain why the ABA Professionalism Committee Report, the
Carnegie Foundation Report, and the Best Practices Study all approve
of such requirements. 2 And doubtless it helps to explain, too, why
many law schools include a perspectives requirement in their curriculum. 253

nevertheless suggestive that there is likely to be considerable variation among schools. At
none of the three schools, it should be noted, was there a collective institutional
recommendation that students take a perspectives course.
At Mercer, where the faculty has not replaced the requirement that students take a
perspectives course with an institutional strong recommendation that they do so,
preliminary figures for the first group of students to be affected by the change suggest that
by the time they graduate approximately 65% will have elected to take a perspectives
course.
251. It is perhaps ironic that law schools typically continue to require many courses,
especially in the first year, that are supported by the neo-Langdellian prejudice. Precisely
because they are so supported, these courses are the ones least in need of curricular
defense through the imposition of a requirement because virtually all, if not indeed all,
students would take them anyway-in their minds, these courses, unlike perspectives
courses, concern "real law," and of course, they are tested on the Bar examination.
252. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
253. I conducted a survey on the law school associate deans listserve in February 2012
and a survey on the law school registrars listserve in March 2012 requesting information
regarding perspectives courses and perspectives requirements or recommendations. These
surveys together generated replies from twenty-nine schools. In addition, in January 2012
I also conducted a quick and definitely non-exhaustive Internet search using the search
term "law school curriculum perspectives course requirements," http://www.bing.coml
search?q=law+school+curriculum+perspectives+course+requirements&qs=n&sk=&pc=
MDDR&x=148&y=14&first=1&FORM=PERE.
As a result of these inquiries, I have been able to ascertain that, in addition to Harvard,
the following twenty-three law schools require their students to take a perspectives course
more or less as understood in this Article: Baltimore, Boston College, Campbell, Capital,
Cleveland-Marshall, Georgetown, Gonzaga, Louisville, Loyola Chicago, Loyola Los Angeles,
Loyola New Orleans, Louisiana State University, Marquette, New Mexico, Northwestern,
Pennsylvania, St. Mary's, South Carolina, Suffolk, Tennessee, Touro, Valparaiso, and
Washburn. Given the limited response to my surveys and the cursory nature of my
Internet search, it is very likely that several other law schools also impose a perspectives
requirement.
Notre Dame no longer has a perspectives course requirement as such (see supra text
accompanying note 244), but students must take a required course in Jurisprudence.
Moreover, Notre Dame also recommends that students take a perspectives course as well.
Some other law schools, such as Cornell, do not impose any requirement but recommend
that students take a perspectives course. Mercer has now joined this group. (Sources on
file with Author).
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There is a legitimate concern that because students may resent and
have little enthusiasm for upper-class requirements after a year of
required courses, the imposition of an upper class perspectives course
requirement may impede the learning process and prove counterproductive. In meeting this concern, there may be some circumstances,
arguably, where a strong recommendation may be more effective than
a requirement. Consideration of three variables is suggestive of the
possible need for nuance. First, the proportion of required courses in the
upper-class curriculum may help determine student reaction. Thus, if a
school requires little after the first year or, as at Yale, after the first
semester, a strong recommendation may carry special weight. Conversely, the more a school requires after the first year, the stronger the
message that non-prescribed courses are not important to take, even if
strongly recommended. Second, a strong recommendation may carry
more weight with a smaller student body where students know the
faculty better. Third, such a recommendation may also carry more
weight with a student body whose interests more readily incline in the
direction of perspectives courses.
A separate but important question is whether, if a dedicated perspectives course is required, the requirement should take the form of a firstyear requirement. If the faculty wishes to convey a message of importance, there is no better way to do so than placing the requirement in
the first year. By the same token, it is reasonable to ask whether the
absence in the first year of a perspectives course sends a message of
relative unimportance that even an upper-class perspectives requirement
may be unable to dispel." 4
If a law school curriculum does require students to take a perspectives
course, there can still be issues regarding the adequacy and effectiveness
of the exposure provided. 55 First, students may prioritize courses
addressing "real law" when rationing their limited time and effot,
paying less attention to the perspectives course in their preparation and
review. Second, a requirement that students take one from a slate of
perspectives courses risks sending an institutional signal that, in the
words of one scholar, "what is viewed as beneficial is the abstract idea

254. Moreover, it would seem dubious to maintain that a dedicated perspectives
exposure could only be properly understood or appreciated following acquisition of the the
building blocks in the first year. I am indebted to my colleague Dean Gary Simson for the
insights in those two paragraphs.
255. The three issues discussed in this paragraph are interconnected and reflect, once
again, the continuing influence of the neo-Langdellian prejudice. Moreover, the issues and
their suggested solution also apply where a school adopts a strong recommendation instead
of a requirement.
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of 'perspective' and not the particular type of perspective to be gained
from a given course."25 Consequently, "[olne perspective course, it
seems, is as valuable as another," which "could be interpreted to mean,
of course, that none has any particular value, or that 'perspective' can
be acquired by taking a course or two," a view that "is ultimately not
inconsistent with the belief . . . that such courses remain, when all is
Third, although a course addressing a
said and done, but frills."25
particular type of perspectives subject matter will be systematic and
integrative within the particular perspectives discipline addressed, it
will lack interdisciplinary comprehensiveness across the entire range and
diversity of potential perspectives.
The solution to all three issues is to require a perspectives exposure
that is as comprehensive as possible instead of one that is partial. Given
other pressing curricular demands, it is unrealistic to require students
to take more than one or two perspectives courses. However, they could
reasonably be required to take one foundational general perspectives
course addressing both the social and the cultural dimensions of law, or
perhaps, instead, one course addressing the social dimensions and
another addressing the cultural dimensions.5 8
The challenge is to design one or more general perspectives courses
that would provide such comprehensive foundational perspectives
Team teaching by
coverage effectively, efficiently, and credibly.'

256. James P. Rowles, Toward Balancing the Goals of Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 375, 385-86 (1981).
257. Id. at 386. Rowles is not discussing a perspectives course requirement per se but
pointing out that the attitude even at the leading national schools that regard perspectives
courses as desirable or even essential is ultimately not inconsistent with the belief, "widely
shared at the lesser schools," that such courses are just frills. However, his observations
seem equally applicable to a requirement that students take one from a slate of
perspectives courses.
258. Relevant transnational dimensions could also be included in the coverage of such
course(s), although my own preference would be to devote a separate foundational required
course to the transnational dimensions of law collectively, both those focused on
"perspectives," that is, comparative legal ordering, and those focused on the conduct and
regulation of international business transactions and the regulation of migration flows. For
further discussion of this distinction among the transnational dimensions, see supra note
137 and accompanying text.
259. Both the Perspectives on Law course at the University of British Columbia
described in the Carnegie Foundation Report, supra note 245, and the redesigned Harvard
Law School curriculum referenced in the Best Practices Study, supranote 246, apparently
tend in this direction of trying to provide more comprehensive perspectives coverage in one
required course or a limited number of required courses. Moreover, both the Kuklin and
Stempel book, supra note 192, and the Crump book, supra note 197, support this same
tendency. I have.myself been working for some years on developing a set of teaching
materials intended for a general perspectives course addressing the cultural dimensions

1050

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

faculty with expertise in different perspectives disciplines holds promise
in this regard,260 but many faculties do not offer a breadth of perspectives expertise. Depending on staffing available, the required general
course(s) would not necessarily replace the more specialized perspectives
courses in the curriculum. Such course(s) could provide a foundation for
subsequent, in-depth exploration in the specialized perspectives
courses. 261

of law and employing an approach that will serve to integrate these diverse perspectives
(historical, jurisprudential, and comparative) within one overarching organizational
framework. Only time will tell whether this ambition is foolishly hubristic or not.
260. The Perspectives on Law course at the University of British Columbia described
in the Carnegie Foundation Report, supra note 245, is an example of this approach. For
another example, see the elective "Perspectives on Law" course at the University of
Minnesota School of Law, which is also team-taught: http://www.law.umn.edu/prospective
/curriculum.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
261. The foundational nature of such course(s) would be enhanced if they were placed
in the first year, and even the first semester. Moreover, such course(s) could then even be
presented as a "bridge from college" that would nicely balance the "bridge to practice"
courses in the third year. Even in the absence of a perspectives requirement, such general
perspectives course(s) would be a valuable addition to the law school curriculum.
In addition to considering the creation of foundational general perspectives courses, or
locating a dedicated perspectives experience in the first year, or both, law schools may wish
to consider other types of prudent reforms that would enhance the students' learning
experience and reduce their dissatisfaction with a dedicated perspectives course
requirement. These reforms include the following: (1) Defining more clearly the purposes
and values of perspectives courses; (2) Including in any Perspectives Block only those
courses and seminars that serve such purposes and values; (3) Requiring faculty teaching
perspectives courses to discuss content and methods with each other on an ongoing basis;
and (4) Communicating to students more effectively these purposes and values and why
faculty think it important for them to receive a dedicated perspectives exposure. Based on
the discussion in this article I offer the following as one possible description of courses in
a Perspectives Block:
This Law School is committed to exposing students to the broader dimensions of law
and legal practice (that is, the political and social science dimensions, the historical,
jurisprudential, and comparative dimensions, and the dimension of international legal
order) through a required and sustained perspectives experience. By providing
students with a broader perspective on the many different aspects of law and
lawyering, perspectives courses (a) promote an understanding of the broader context
of legal practice; (b) develop certain types of distinctive knowledge, skills, and
dispositions needed to make more effective legal arguments, to engage in more
effective law reform efforts, and generally to practice law in a legal environment
characterized by increasing diversity and pluralism; (c) reinforce the qualities and
values central to lawyer professionalism; and (d) further develop a sense of
professional identity and meaningful work by enabling students to forge a connection
to the animating purposes and accomplishments of the law and the legal profession.
One could also add the following to reinforce the practical and professional value of
perspectives courses: "The doctrinal law that you learn in law school has a limited shelf
life. Perspectives on the law are permanent. In that sense, perspectives courses can be
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Whether a dedicated perspectives course is required or strongly
recommended, wherever it is placed in the curriculum, and whatever its
precise nature, it is essential that law schools communicate effectively
and forcefully to students why it is important that they receive a serious
and sustained perspectives exposure during their legal education. This
will help to combat the influence of the neo-Langdellian prejudice as well
as the absolutizing of "consumer choice." 262
VI.

CONCLUSION

In arguing for a perspectives course requirement, I have emphasized
the importance of such a requirement to law schools' primary mission of
preparing students properly for the practice of law.263 In closing, I
would like to underline the importance of such a requirement to what I
and many others regard as a significant secondary mission of law
schools: to prepare students properly to serve as civic and political
leaders in society. 6 Historically, lawyers have served in a wide

among the most practical courses that you can take while you are in law school." Email
of Feb. 28, 2012 from Lloyd Mayer to the Author describing Notre Dame's perspectives
recommendation (on file with Author).
262. Although the imposition of a perspectives course requirement or a collective
institutional strong recommendation, and even a communication regarding the value of a
serious and sustained perspectives exposure, may appear "paternalistic," students deserve
our best judgment regarding how their law school experience can best prepare them for the
practice of law. It is instructive that already in 1994 (and surely the situation has not
improved since then), Kuklin and Stempel contended that "too many students study law
without adequate grounding in the liberal arts." KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 196, at 6.
They reported their experience that "we cannot overemphasize the frequently found gaps
in student knowledge.. . . Viewing the often ahistorical or foundationless perspective of
students can sometimes be disconcerting or frightening from the front of the class." Id. at
2-3. Observing that "[elven today's bright students who attend prestigious high schools and
colleges frequently seem not to be exposed to what we thought was standard liberal arts
learning about philosophy, economics, history, psychology, sociology and political science,"
they explain that they are not surprised given their own need to fill similar gaps in their
own knowledge. Id. at 1. I can certainly relate given the need to fill many such gaps in my
knowledge as well.
263. The argument has been premised on what I believe will remain an important
vision of legal practice for a long time to come no matter what alternative visions develop
based on the changing nature of lawyers' work. For a good account of anticipated changes
and corresponding alternative visions, and of the value of perspectives subject matter and
courses in such plural visions, see Larry E. Ribstein, PracticingTheory: Legal Education
for the Twenty-First Century, 96 IOwA L. REv. 1649 (2011).
264. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman Jr., Lawyers as Leaders, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
266, 266-67 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/102.pdf (arguing that "[t]he
profession and the law schools should more candidly recognize the importance of leadership
and should more directly prepare and inspire young lawyers to seek roles of ultimate
responsibility and accountability than they do today" and observing that "today's law
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variety of leadership roles, ranging from positions of national importance, such as President or member of Congress, to positions of state
and local importance, such as state legislator, board of education chair,
and corporate CEO.265 Lawyers are not the only citizens who lead, of
course, but lawyers have always been central in leading the Republic
throughout its history. This was true during the first phase in the
historical development of legal education,266 and it is true today. What
lawyers have to offer as citizen leaders is the result of their being
trained in ways that others generally are not.267
I believe that legal educators owe a responsibility to society to prepare
practically wise citizen leaders, as well as practically wise legal
practitioners, who possess the particular ensemble of substantive
knowledge, practical skills, and qualities of character needed for such
leadership.2 6 8 Whether or not these extend beyond those required for

schools are muted or ambivalent about leadership").
265. Cf id. at 268 (discussing how "[1] awyers with vision and an ability to effect change
have . . . played central roles in major historic events").

266. See Jones, Historical Framework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1134-39, 1149-52
(discussing Robert Gordon's account of the influence of elite "republican lawyer-statesmen"
throughout American society and Russell Pierce's claim that the "legal elite's original and
uniquely American understanding of the lawyer's role was that lawyers were America's
governing class") (quoting Russell Pearce, Lawyers As America's Governing Class: The
Formationand Dissolutionof the Original Understandingof the American Lawyer's Role,
8 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 382 n.5 (2001)).
267. Although there are other causes as well, including structural causes, one
important cause of the excessive partisanship, incivility, and lack of compromise that
characterize much of contemporary politics in the United States may be the apparently
waning influence of lawyers and traditional lawyerly virtues in our assemblies of public
deliberation. For an illuminating discussion of some of the structural causes, see Fareed
Zakaria, A Way Out of OurDysfunctional Politics,WASH. POST, July 20, 2011, http//www.
washingtonpost.com/opinionsla-way-out-of-our-dysfunctional-politics/2011/07/20/gIQATEQ
cQIstory.html (discussing how the "structure of politics" has changed over the last three
or four decades "making it more beholden to narrow, specialized interests-including
ideological ones-rather than broader national ones," and identifying such factors as: the
creation of safe seats through redistricting; the take-over of party primaries by small
groups of activists; changes in Congressional rules making it much more difficult to enact
large, compromise legislation by allowing lobbyists, money, and special interests far greater
access to and influence over the legislative process; and the presence of a new narrowcast
media that fuels polarization).
268. I also believe that this responsibility is enhanced due to law schools' de facto
credentialing role for leadership positions, that is, lawyers have greatly increased access
to such leadership positions simply because they are lawyers-becausethey have acquired
knowledge, skills, and qualities of character that are necessary for citizen leadership, and
perhaps just as important, because they are perceived by others to have such attributes.
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good lawyering, 269 the ensemble surely includes a familiarity with the
social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law acquired in a broadbased legal education that ensures serious and sustained perspectives
exposure. 270 This was well understood during the first phase, 27 ' and
it should be well understood today. Society needs lawyers who are truly
ready to lead, and that means ones who possess a solid understanding
of the animating purposes and accomplishments of the law and of
politics and of how those purposes and accomplishments relate to pursuit
of the common good.
269. Jack Sammons's account of how the virtues of the good lawyer would be revealed
in a community group conversation "even if the conversation had not afforded the lawyer
the opportunity to display his or her knowledge of legal matters" might suggest that the
attributes necessary for good lawyering suffice for good leadership. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text. Others may consider that additional attributes are necessary. See
Heineman, supra note 264, at 267 (identifying several "important qualities of mind that
go beyond the core competencies taught in law schools").
270. See Heineman, supra note 264, at 268 (arguing that "[blreadth of mind is needed
more than ever today because many young lawyers will have more careers than their
predecessors, often as part of multi-disciplinary teams," and discussing the curricular
exposures and experiences, and other programmatic changes including increased
opportunities for joint degrees, that are needed to help students acquire the necessary
breadth). Whatever the reader may conclude regarding Heineman's proposals for extensive
curricular and programmatic reform designed to prepare lawyers for leadership, what I
advocate in the present Article is a much more modest and, I believe, more realistic goal
for most law schools, at least in the shorter term. Without wishing to be unduly
controversial, one might offer the recent experience in Iraq as underscoring the importance
of cultivating breadth of mind and an appreciation of complexity for practically wise
leadership. See, e.g., PETER W. GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: How AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE CREATED A WAR WYTHour END (2006); PETER BEINART, THE ICARUS SYNDROME: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN HUBRis 10-11, 337-65, 371-75 (2010); Medea Benjamin & Charles
Davis, From 'Liberation'to Occupation: 10 Reasons Iraq Was No Cakewalk, HUFFINGTON
POST, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.huffngtonpost.com/medea-benjamin/ten-reasons-the-iraqwar- b_836910.html.
271. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining that, in considerable
part due to the influence of the lawyer-statesman ideal and the underlying political
philosophy of civic republicanism, most legal educators during the first phase provided a
broad-based education in order to prepare their students both for legal practice and for
political leadership).
272. Heineman strikes a hopeful note regarding the potential for lawyers to find a
sense of calling, purpose, and identity in their role as leaders. See Heineman, supra note
264, at 270:
I believe that the lawyer as leader is an ideal that can be realized. At the least,
the quest can be a key to a fuilfilled professional life, to a life that merges who we
are and what we do. Today is a wonderful time to be blessed with legal training
and to be able to go out and take on the enormous challenges of a difficult
world-with an aspiration to lead tempered by humility at the complexity,
difficulty, discipline, and self-sacrifice inherent in the task.
Id.
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In sum, law schools owe it to their students, the legal profession, and
society to provide a holistic legal education that prepares the "complete
lawyer" for legal practice and for citizen leadership by ensuring that a
properly balanced treatment of all six sets of fundamental dimensions
of law and lawyering is integrated within law school programs." This
includes designing a serious, sustained, and effective perspectives
exposure. 24 This is our responsibility as we form the souls of our

273. Perhaps in this way we wil usher in a fifth phase in the historical development
of U.S. legal education-the integrative phase (or perhaps, more accurately, the reintegrative phase)-in which all six sets offundamental dimensions are properly integrated
in an appropriately balanced manner in the practically wise development of law school
programs and in which, moreover, various competing jurisprudential paradigms are
properly integrated in an appropriately balanced manner in practically wise legal
reasoning. For identification of prior phases in the historical development of U.S. legal
education, see supra Part II.B. and accompanying notes, especially notes 49, 51. For
identification of competing jurisprudential paradigms that have emerged during this
development, see supra text accompanying notes 32, 35. See also Jones, Historical
Framework Phase I, supra note 2, at 1203 n.586.
274. It is possible to make an additional case for the value of a serious, sustained, and
effective perspectives exposure, although it is not one upon which I rely in this Article, and
that is the case made by Daniel Boorstin in a seminal article over sixty years ago regarding
the relevance of perspectives subject matter to the study of law not in a "pragmatic spirit"
but "in the humane spirit." See Daniel Boorstin, The Humane Study of Law, 57 YALE L.J.
960 (1948). Thus, studying law "in the humane spirit" means that studies are based on
"intellectual curiosity, imagination, and interest," allowing
the nature and development of legal institutions [to] be examined in many
different ways, with the fullest regard for the complex totality of man's past and
present, material and spiritual concerns; and not with an eye solely for the utility
of such investigations for improving the skills of the practising lawyer, or for
guarding the interests of particular clients (whether individuals or groups), or for
maximizing immediate social goods.
Id. at 965. Boorstin explains further:
The humane study of law would at least try to bring the study of the legal past
and present into relation with the whole human being, with his striving for a
moral order as well as his scramble to satisfy his material interests. In this way
such an approach (compared with the pragmatic view) would be at once more
objective (that is, more attentive to the whole of man as he actually is), and more
normative, since it makes the study of law more effectively a part of our quest for
what is essentially human. It would at the same time relax and enrich the
intellectual atmosphere in which legal institutions are to be studied-or perhaps
even practised-and it would lead us freely into the neglected fields of comparative
law, into the past of many nations, and into the whole context, physical, social and
spiritual, of human life.
Id. at 975. Boorstin was not advocating reform of the law school curriculum "in the humane
spirit" but rather that higher education should make a place for the study of law in this
spirit (in interdisciplinary graduate programs, for example). Id. at 972-73. However, his
portrayal captures something of the additional benefit experienced by students who receive
serious and sustained perspectives exposure along the lines suggested in this Article,
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students and thereby make our distinctive contribution to the common
good of the Republic.

beyond the pragmatic value of such exposure in preparing lawyers directly for legal
practice and for citizen-leadership.
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